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Abstract
Although set against the background of investigations by the European Commission in proceedings for the application of the main competition rules of the EU, the discussion remains at the
level of broad principles. The driving notion of this article is that the basis and ratio for judicial
recognition of a privileged communications doctrine in EU law must be defined explicitly, and that
this definition may have important consequences as to the scope and practical administrability of
the doctrine. Part I explores the principal rationales usually claimed for the privilege: the utilitarian view and the rights-based approach. This discussion serves as useful background to understand
the position of EU law regarding operation of the privilege in competition proceedings conducted
by the Commission. Part II describes the state of the law since AM&S, commenting on the personal and material scope of the current privilege rule, the possible reasons underlying its strict
conditions, and the procedural arrangements for resolving privilege disputes. It then considers
whether changes in the legal context since AM&S have eroded the foundations of this judgment.

LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE
IN COMPETITION PROCEEDINGS BEFORE
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION:
BEYOND THE CURSORY GLANCE
Eric Gippini-Fournier*
Como el abogado non debe descobrirla poridat del pleyto de su
parte a la otra
Visada cosa es, e derecha, que los abogados, aquig dizen los omes
las poridades de sus pleytos, que las guarden, e que no las descubran
ala otra parte ...e cualquieraque contra estoficiere, desque lefuere
provado: mandamos, que dende adelante sea dado por ome de mala
fama, e que nunca pueda ser abogado, nin consejero, en ningun
pleyto . . . los omes . . . muestran a los abogados sus pleytos, e
descubrenles sus poraidades: por que puedan mejor tomar consejo, e
ayuda dellos.t
* LL.M. (Coll. Europe); LL.M. (Berkeley); Member of the European Commis-

sion's Legal Service; Visiting Lecturer, Universit6 de Tours. This Article was originally
presented at the 2004 Fordham Corporate Law Institute's Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy. Several cases concerning the subject matter of this
article are pending. Although I will not comment on them directly, some disclosures
seem appropriate. I have been an official with the European Commission ("Commission") since 1995, and I served as "reffrendaire" (law clerk) with the President of the
European Court of Justice ("Court of Justice") from 2002 to 2003. In neither position
have I been involved with any of the cases mentioned above. Many thanks to F. Castillo
de la Torre, A. Font Galarza, J. Lete Achirica, K. Mojzesowicz, M. Szpunar, Ph. Van den
Wyngaert, and W. Wils, who were kind enough to comment - within an unreasonably
short time - on a first draft of this paper or otherwise provide helpful assistance. Of
course, mistakes and omissions remain mine. The views expressed here are purely personal, and should not be construed as representing the views of any of the persons or
institutions mentioned.
t Partida III.-Tit. VI.-De los abogados (1265). I thank my colleague J. L. Buendia
for providing a facsimile of an early print edition of Las Siete Partidas (1555), a sevenpart code compiled around 1265 from Visigothic, Roman, and Church law under the
supervision of Alfonso X, the Wise (1252-1284), of Castile. The expansion of Spain in
the sixteenth century gave the Partidas the widest territorial application ever for any
codified body of law. In many jurisdictions now under the sovereignty of the United
States, modem law began with the Partidas. As recent as 1924, for example, the Louisiana Supreme Court devoted the major part of an opinion to the law of the Partidas. In
Texas and California, Spanish law remained in force for some time, and the Partidas
are frequently cited in the early court reports of these states. An online search of U.S.
case law reveals more than fifty cases mentioning the Partidas in states such as Arkansas,
Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Missouri, North Carolina, Nevada, and New Mexico. For a new five-volume English translation of the Partidas, see LAS SIETE PARTIDAS, (S. P. Scott trans., R. I. Burns ed., 2000). The translation
provided here is mine.
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[On how the lawyer must not reveal the intimacy of his
party's case to the other
A wise and just thing it is, that lawyers, to whom men tell
the intimacies of their disputes, shall guard them and shall
not disclose them to the other party ...

and if any of them

acts against this, and this is proven, it is ordered that he shall
be henceforth regarded as disreputable, and that he be
banned from ever being a lawyer again, or an advisor, in any
litigation.., men.., show lawyers their disputes and uncover
their every secret, so that they can take better advice and assistance from them.]
Since the 1982judgment of the Court ofJustice of the European Communities ("Court of Justice") in Australian Mining &
Smelting Europe Ltd. v. Commission ("AM&S"),' the law of the European Union ("EU") 2 has imposed restrictions on the ability of
the European Commission ("the Commission") to obtain and
present documents constituting communications between a lawyer and his or her client as evidence in its competition investigations. The Order of the President of the Court of First Instance
of the European Communities ("CFI") in Akzo Nobel Chemicals
and Another v. E.C. Commission ("Akzo") 3 has brought this area of
law into the spotlight again, reviving academic debate about
whether the rules established in AM&S are outdated and should
be changed. This order was subsequently quashed on appeal to
the Court ofJustice. 4 A decision on the merits is expected, prob1. Australian Mining & Smelting Europe Ltd. v. E.C. Commission, Case 155/79,
[1982] E.C.R. 1575, [1982] 2 C.M.L.R. 264 [hereinafter AM&S].
2. This Article refers indistinctly to "EU law" and "EC law," although technically
the competition rules remain in the Treaty establishing the European Community
("EC"), which is only one of the founding treaties of the European Union ("EU"). See
Consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European Community, OJ. C 325/
33 (2002), 37 I.L.M. 79 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporatingchanges made by Treaty of
Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the
European Communities and certain related acts, Oct. 2, 1997, OJ. C 340/1 (1997)
[hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam] (amending Treaty on European Union ("TEU"),
Treaty establishing the European Community, Treaty establishing the European Coal
and Steel Community ("ECSC Treaty"), and Treaty establishing the European Atomic
Energy Community ("Euratom Treaty") and Atomic Energy Community (Euratom
Treaty") and renumbering articles of TEU and EC Treaty).
3. Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd. and Akcros Chemicals Ltd. v. Commission, Joined
Cases T-125/03 R & T-253/03 R, [2004] E.C.R. _, [2004] 4 C.M.L.R. 15 [hereinafter
Akzo].
4. Commission v. Akzo Nobel Chemicals, Case C-7/04 P(R) (ECJ Sept. 27, 2004)
(not yet reported).
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ably some time in 2006.
Not surprisingly, the defense bar embraced the first Akzo order for widening the categories of material that should be protected from scrutiny by the Commission.' In-house lawyers,
whose communications are not protected under AM&S, have
also joined the fray with renewed demands that the law be
changed.6 Commentary on AM&S by practitioners and academics from common law jurisdictions invariably tends towards enthusiastic assimilation of the law applicable in those jurisdictions
to the "legal professional" or "attorney-client" privilege.7 Many
of those commentators appear to praise Akzo for effectively abandoning AM&S by recognizing a broad right to oppose compelled disclosure to the Commission of any communication containing or reflecting the views of a lawyer, or prepared in connection with obtaining the views of a lawyer, or even, more
generally, of any information submitted to a lawyer.
This Article takes a slightly different approach. Although
set against the background of investigations by the European
Commission in proceedings for the application of the main competition rules of the EU,8 the discussion remains at the level of
broad principles. The driving notion of this article is that the
basis and ratio for judicial recognition of a privileged communications doctrine in EU law must be defined explicitly, and that
this definition may have important consequences as to the scope
and practical administrability of the doctrine. Part I explores
the principal rationales usually claimed for the privilege: the
utilitarian view and the rights-based approach. This discussion
serves as useful background to understand the position of EU
law regarding operation of the privilege in competition proceedings conducted by the Commission. Part II describes the state of
5. See Press Release, International Bar Association ("IBA"), IBA Section on Business Law Joins Action in Europe to Reinstate Legal Privilege for In-House Counsel
(Dec. 10, 2003).
6. See, e.g., European Company Lawyers Association ("ECLA"), The Case for Inhouse Legal Privilege in EC Law, available at http://www.ecla.org (last visited Oct. 22,
2004); see also ECLA, In-house Legal Privilege Needed with Modernization of EC Competition Law, available at http://www.ecla.org (last visited Oct. 22, 2004).
7. See, e.g., A. M. Hill, A Problem of Privilege: In-House Counsel and the Attorney-Client
Privilege in the United States and the European Community, 27 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 145
(1995); see also G. Murphy, CH Signals PossibleExtension of ProfessionalPrivilegeto In-House
Lawyers, 25(7) EUR. COMP. L. Ruv. 447 (2004).
8. See EC Treaty, supra note 2, arts. 81-82, O.J. C 325/33, at 64-65.

970

FORDHAMAITERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 28:967

the law since AM&S, commenting on the personal and material
scope of the current privilege rule, the possible reasons underlying its strict conditions, and the procedural arrangements for
resolving privilege disputes. It then considers whether changes
in the legal context since AM&S have eroded the foundations of
this judgment.
A utilitarian view of the privilege presents some conceptual
difficulties and, although may well inspire a commendable policy, does not necessarily command judicial recognition of a wide
lawyer-client privilege in competition investigations. AM&S
strikes a balance between the interests of the company under
investigation and the interests of fact-finding in law enforcement. I argue that this balance is coherent with the minimal
demands of a non-utilitarian approach to the privilege, based on
the rights of defense of the client. In many respects, the AM&S
judgment is consistent with -

and may even exceed -

the re-

quirements of the rights of defense as defined in the European
context. While a different approach to the privilege is perfectly
conceivable, I therefore find no basis in EU law compelling expansion of the privilege beyond the needs of the rights of defense. It is also my belief that the premises upon which the
AM&S solution was based remain essentially unchanged. Substantial changes to the law would therefore require more sophisticated consideration than is often offered.
PRELIMINARY REMARKS
Any discussion about the need for, and the proper scope of,
a doctrine of legal privilege requires clarification of what is to be
understood by "legal privilege," of the setting where privilege
claims are to develop their effects, and of the legal effects of the
rule.
In the most general terms, "legal privilege" will be used here
to mean "a rule of law according to which certain lawyer-client
communications cannot be subject to compelled disclosure in
legal proceedings," and "[i]f disclosed against the will of the client .

.

. [will be] inadmissible as evidence in the proceedings."

"Legal proceedings" here refers not only to judicial proceedings
but also to administrative enforcement proceedings where an administrative agency has investigative powers allowing it to com-
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pel production of evidence from parties subject to the investigation.
Competition proceedings before the European Commission
constitute one such example of the administrative enforcement
of "public law" prohibitive rules.9 As the administrative authority
in charge of prosecuting infringements, the Commission possesses limited power to compel production of business records
and documents. This is the main category of evidence for which
legal privilege claims may arise in procedures before the Commission, if not the only one. Claims concerning other types of
evidence and proceedings may arise in other legal systems, but
are absent here. There is no civil litigation before either the
Commission or the EU courts. Generally speaking, EU law does
not govern the rules of production and discoverability of evidence before Member State courts where such civil litigation
arises. In those jurisdictions where civil procedure provides for
extensive discovery between the parties, the contours of any priv9. "Public law" (as opposed to "private law") is that part of the legal system which
deals with the legal and political relationships between government and the citizen, and
not with the private legal dealings between citizens. See BLACK'S LAw DicrIONARY 500,
513 (Pocket ed. 1996). I use it here in a more limited sense to refer to areas of substantive law concerned with protecting collective and diffuse interests (as opposed to private rights) through prescriptive and prohibitive rules which are enforced, at least in
part, by public authorities vested with special powers to compel compliance with, and
sanction breaches of, the law. Administrative enforcement of competition laws or environmental regulations is an example. Whether the scope of the investigative powers of
the European Commission - and therefore the scope of the legal privilege itself might be different in the context of merger control (where a violation of the law is not
at stake) is outside the scope of this article. In Hilti AG v. Commission of the European
Communities, Case T-30/89, [1990] E.C.R. 11-163, [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. 602, the Court of
First Instance upheld AM&S, specifying that legal privilege covers written communications exchanged between lawyer and client "after the initiation of the administrative
procedure which may lead to a decision on the application of Articles 85 and 86 of the
Treaty [now Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty] or to a decision imposing a pecuniary
sanction on the undertaking." Id. 13. The Court did not mention merger control
proceedings, although the original Merger Regulation, providing for roughly the same
investigative powers available in proceedings concerning Articles 81 and 82 of the EC
Treaty, had been adopted only some months before. See Council Regulation No. 4064/
89, O.J. L 395/1 (1989), corrected version in O.J. L 257/13 (1990), arts. 11-13 [hereinafter
Merger Regulation]; see also Commission of the European Communities, Della Vedova
Report on the Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Control of Concentrations
between Undertakings: "The EC Merger Regulation", COM(5) 257 Final, at 30 (July
2004) (stating that "it does not seem appropriate to put the Commission's powers of
investigation as regards mergers on the same level as the strengthened powers recently
envisaged in the regulation on cartels, since the areas are completely different"). In
merger investigations, the European Parliament favored extension of legal privilege to
in-house counsel. See id.
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ilege for client-lawyer communications remain defined by national law alone. In other words, AM&S does not directly control the discoverability or admissibility of evidence in national
court proceedings, even in actions where the infringement of
EU competition law is the subject of the dispute."0 This does not
mean that the scope of the privilege in the case law of the Court
of Justice is without any influence on the standard applicable in
national proceedings. The main point here is that EU law does
not directly require national investigations and proceedings to
protect legal privilege to the same standard as that defined by
the Court of Justice for Commission investigations. National
rules recognizing a broader scope for legal privilege are compatible with the existence of a narrower standard in investigations
conducted by the Commission. Narrower privilege rules may
also subsist. However, the source and rationale for legal privilege
may be decisive in this regard: human rights and fundamental
principles of EU law need to be respected also in national actions, in particular where Articles 81 and 82 are applied.1 1
The definition of "legal privilege" proposed above is purposefully austere in normative value. It does not say, for example, what is meant by "lawyer-client communications" or a "lawyer," nor does it specify the conditions, if any, which must be
satisfied for lawyer-client communications to be covered by the
privilege. It does, however, roughly delineate the province of
operation and validity of the rule of legal privilege in EC law,
and distinguishes legal privilege proper from related rules governing the confidentiality of communications between lawyer
and client.
This distinction is critical for our purposes because these
other related confidentiality rules are not directly governed by
EC law. When the Court ofJustice defines the scope of a rule of
legal privilege in competition proceedings before the Commission, it is only confronted with the issues of compellability and admissibility of evidence. It does not define the scope of any confidentiality obligations lawyers may have outside the framework of
10. This may be the case in an action for damages or for breach of contract. Contra
J. Philip, EEC Competition Law and Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in English Law, in
LEGAL ISSUES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 49, 51, 74-75 (Martijn van Empel et al. eds.,
1981).
11. For a discussion of these questions, as well as of the "soft harmonization" effect
of the AAM&Sjudgment, see infta notes 184-93 and accompanying text.
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these legal proceedings, nor is it concerned with the legal consequences of a breach of these duties.
This is an important issue to understand, because it is easy,
though unhelpful, to incorporate other legal concepts related to
the preservation of confidentiality in lawyer-client communications into a discussion of legal privilege. This is why the expression "legal privilege," though foreign to most European jurisdictions, is preferable to "confidentiality" or "professional secrecy"
for the purposes of our discussion. Referring to "professional
secrecy" or "confidentiality" as the equivalent of legal privilege in
civil law jurisdictions only leads to confusion. Professional secrecy as such is a duty, a generic obligation imposed on a professional to keep matters discussed with the client in strict confidence and not to disclose them to third parties. A number of
legal constructs revolve around the professional secrecy duties of
lawyers, each implicating different legal consequences, including: disciplinary sanctions on the basis of ethical rules applying
to the profession, criminal sanctions, and private actions for
breach of contract or non-contractual liability. 2 Several other
professions are also subject to duties of professional secrecy emanating from a variety of sources, including, inter alia, laws, contracts, private association statutes, ethical rules, and oaths. But
there is no inherent relationship between such duties of "professional secrecy" or "confidentiality" and a privilege against the
compelled production of evidence, even where such duties emanate from legislation. Many professions have a duty of secrecy,
few have privilege.
Since 1822, for example, successive versions of the Spanish
Criminal Code have rendered the "revelation of secrets" a felony. The 1822 version of the Code applied to "clerics, lawyers,
doctors, surgeons, pharmacists, barbers, midwives and any
others," though subsequent amendments variously redefined the
personal scope of the crime. In its current version, this provi12. In common law jurisdictions, disciplinary sanctions and private actions for
"breach of confidence" are based on "agency rules of confidentiality." See JONATHAN
AUBURN, LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE-LAW AND THEORY 1 (2000) (noting that "the
privilege is not a branch or variant of any over-arching confidentiality doctrine, and is
sometimes driven by goals which are slightiy different from these other rules"); see also
Charles W. Wolfram, The U.S. Law of Client Confidentiality: Framework for an International
Perspective, 15 FoRDHAM INT'L L. J. 529, 544-46 (1992) (delineating the "agency law of
confidentiality" as applied to lawyers in the United States).
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sion criminalizes the revelation of secrets by "anybody who has
learnt them by reason of his profession or of a relationship of
employment," and foresees aggravated sanctions where secrets
13
are revealed in breach of a professional duty of confidentiality.
The existence of a duty of "professional secrecy" for domestic
help employees, for instance, has been recognized by the Spanish Constitutional Court.' 4 It is abundantly clear, however, that
this "duty" does not automatically provide protection against giving evidence when so required in legal proceedings. The Spanish Constitution provides that privileges against court testimony
on grounds of professional secrecy will be regulated by law.15
Criminal procedural law in Spain stipulates only two general professional "privileges" against compelled testimony: for "the lawyer representing the accused in a criminal case in relation to
facts communicated by his client in his capacity as defense counsel" and for "priests and ministers of a church in relation to facts
learnt in this capacity. '"16

The different scope, nature, and legal effects of confidentiality obligations and evidentiary privileges can be illustrated by
examples taken from virtually every jurisdiction. In English law,
the breach of confidence doctrine prevents the disclosure of certain communications made in confidence. Although it may have
an impact on the admissibility of evidence in court, however, the
doctrine "cannot stand in the way of legal compulsion, whether
such compulsion comes in the form of a search warrant, an order for discovery, or an order that a particular question be answered by a reluctant witness."1 7 Lawyer confidentiality obligations are closely related to privileges against compelled disclosure, perhaps complementary, but conceptually different
18
nonetheless and therefore mutually independent.
13. See C6digo Penal (C.P. 1822, 199). A primitive and delightfully drafted version
of this provision existed already in Las Siete Partidas.See LAS SIETE PARTIDAS, supra note
-, Partida I, Tit. IV, Ley 85.
14. See STC, May 5, 2000 (R.T.C., No. 115, ground 6).
15. See SPAIN CONST. art. 24(2) (1978), translated in 8 CONSTITUTIONS (1987) (stating that the matter shall be regulated "by law," i.e., by statutory instrument).
16. See Ley deEnjuiciamiento Criminal, (L.E.Crim. 1988, arts. 416(2), 417(1)). There
is also a limited privilege for public officials in matters related to their scope of employment. In civil matters there is a wider "privilege" against testimony by professionals
subject to a duty of confidentiality. These privileges relate only to court testimony. See
C6digo Civil, (C.C. 2002, art. 1247(5)).
17. AUBURN, supra note 12, at 48.
18. The same may be said of other evidentiary privileges: a privilege against mari-
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The material scope of a rule of legal privilege is not coextensive with either communications deemed "confidential" or with
all those covered by "professional secrecy." Duties of confidentiality applicable to lawyers broadly cover all client communications, not only those protected by legal privilege, and apply regardless of the nature or source of the information or the fact
that others may share the knowledge. In the context of competition investigations, information such as business secrets may be
"confidential" with respect to the outside world, and yet be obtained, copied, and used in evidence by the Commission on a
regular basis. Article 12 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003
("Regulation 1/2003") on the implementation of the rules on
competition provides that the Commission and the national
competition authorities "shall have the power to provide one another with and use in evidence any matter of fact or law, including confidential information."19 Confidentiality claims therefore
only arise in relation to transmission of documents to specific
third parties (such as co-defendants or complainants), and more
generally in the context of publication in the Official Journal or
the online posting of decisions or other acts of the Commission
routinely expunged of business secrets and other confidential
matters.2 0 The question of whether documents covered by confidentiality obligations may be disclosed and used in the proceedings is conceptually autonomous within EU courts as well, and
cannot be answered by mere reference to a "duty of confidential21
ity" on the party called to disclose.
The legal consequences of recognizing "privileged" status to
a communication (and to written communication in particular)
are also specific. By definition, legal privilege involves a claim of
confidentiality, not against third parties, but against the adjudital testimony, or even a legal rule preventing spouses or close relatives from testifying,
may exist without a legally enforceable duty of discretion, as any tabloid shows.
19. Council Regulation No. 1/2003, OJ. L 1/1 (2003) [hereinafter Regulation 1/

2003].
20. Article 28 of Regulation 1/2003 provides for a duty of "professional secrecy" in
relation to information "acquired or exchanged pursuant to this Regulation." Id. art.
28. This entails, inter alia, the protection of business secrets against public disclosure.
See Regulation 1/2003, supra note 19, art. 28, Oj. L 1/20, at 20 (2003).
21. See, e.g., Gencor Ltd v. Commission, Case T-102/96, [1997] E.C.R. 11-879 (holding that the duty of confidentiality originating in an agreement between the applicant
and a person not party to the proceedings is not controlling as regards communication
of the information in question to interveners).
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cator itself (in this case, the Commission in its role as law enforcement agency). Though the scope of the legal privilege rule
differs among jurisdictions, its effect can be far-reaching. First,
privilege usually prevents compelled testimony about the communication, and may also determine the inadmissibility of evidence of privileged communications in legal proceedings. As
practiced in common law jurisdictions, legal privilege goes beyond the bar against compelled testimony and the inadmissibility of evidence in legal proceedings, in that it prevents the prosecution, investigative body, or adjudicator from accessing the
communication itself. Thus, a valid claim of legal privilege for
documentary or recorded evidence in most common law jurisdictions bars the investigative body, prosecutor, or adjudicator,
not only from disclosing the relevant document to third parties,
but from copying it and using it as evidence. If a document is
genuinely privileged, the prosecution or investigating authority
may not even access its contents. The underlying assumption is
that merely viewing the contents of a document which turns out
to be privileged may influence their perception of the case as
well as the subsequent course of the investigation, because acute
amnesia cannot be guaranteed.2 2 A rule of legal privilege need
not elicit all the legal consequences listed here, though the most
robust ones do.
I. FOUNDATIONS AND RATIONALIZATIONS
OF THE PRIVILEGE
This is not the place to review in detail the origins and rationales proposed throughout the history of the privilege at common law or under its civil-law-jurisdiction counterparts.2 3 The
standard account of the origins of the common law doctrine in
22. The European Court ofJustice has confirmed that "acute amnesia" cannot reasonably be expected from a competition authority who has seen a document outside
the context of one of its investigations or in the context of an investigation concerning
a different subject matter. See Direcci6n General de Defensa de la Competencia v.
Asociaci6n Espafiola de Banca Privada and others, Case C-67/91, [1992] E.C.R. 1-4785,
39; see also SEP v. Commission, Case C-36/92 P, [19941 E.C.R 1-1911, 29; Opinion of
Advocate General Mischo, ICI v. Commission, Case C-254/99 P, [2002] E.C.R. 1-8375,
191.
23. For information on the privilege within common law jurisdictions, see JOHN
HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw 542 (rev. ed. 1961); see also AuBURN, supra note 12, at 1-9; Geoffrey C. Hazard, An HistoricalPerspective on the AttorneyClient Privilege, 66 CAL. L. REV. 1061 (1978).
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Wigmore's influential treatise holds that the privilege emerged
initially as an "honour-based" prerogative to refuse testimonial
compulsion, and was enjoyed by the lawyer because of his prominent status as a gentleman. Under this "honour" or "dignity"
approach emphasized by subsequent writers, the privilege
stemmed from a concern with the "oath and honour of the attorney" 4 which opposed compelled disclosure of a client's secrets
in violation of the gentleman's code of honor. Although Wigmore's account is almost universally accepted, 2 its accuracy has
since been challenged. Auburn, for instance, doubts that the
early foundation of the privilege can be traced to traditional respect for the honor and status of a lawyer. Early cases before the
Elizabethan Chancery Court in the late sixteenth century show
that high social status did not prevent compelled testimony, even
for the nobility, and that lawyers were not exempt from being
called and examined as witnesses. The privilege operated only
to relieve the lawyer from the duty to answer certain questions
concerning his involvement with the case at hand. 26 According
to Auburn, " [i] t will never be possible to come to a conclusive
answer to the origin of and early rationale for the privilege because the decisive pieces of information, the reasoning underlying the first reported cases and precise knowledge of Pre-Elizabethan Chancery procedure, are simply not available."2"
Whatever its historical foundations, modern discussions
about legal privilege have been concerned with explaining its
rationale and justification. The views taken on the validity of
these rationales and justifications in turn determine the position
taken by writers as to the soundness of the rule itself as well as its
proper personal and material scope.
24. See WIGMORE, supra note 23, at 543 (emphasis in the original). Whether or not
this account of the historical origins of the privilege is accurate, the notion that social
status should determine evidentiary privileges was no longer tenable by the late eighteenth century. Lawyers were able to retain the privilege, one of the justifications proclaimed being in sharp contrast with the alleged "status" origin of the privilege that "the
lawyer was no better than a servant, and there was an old and powerful feeling that a
servant must keep its master's secrets." Comment, Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer
and Other Professionals: Its Implicationsfor the Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71 YALE
L.J. 1226, 1228 (1962) [hereinafter FunctionalOverlap].
25. See AUBURN, supra note 12, at 4.
26. See id. at 5-6.
27. AUBURN, supra note 12, at 7. In criticizing Wigmore's historical account, Auburn indicates that in Chancery Court proceedings the privilege actually operated in
the opposite manner to the "honour exception" for people of high status. See id. at 6.
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A. Disclosure and Privilege under the UtilitarianRationale
Literature about "legal privilege" in common law jurisdictions usually takes for granted its utilitarian basis. Wigmore's
treatment of legal privilege, and of evidentiary privileges in general, has been enormously influential in this regard. This "instrumental" view, as some prefer to call it, 28 holds that the privilege is necessary for the maintenance of good client-lawyer relations: lawyers cannot fulfil their mission without the fullest
possible knowledge of the facts of their client's situation. The
expectation of confidentiality encourages candid communications and the disclosure of all relevant information. Thus the
privilege exists not to protect the immediate result (i.e., the secrecy of the communication) but to promote a broader societal
goal.
Risking heresy, one may wonder what that societal goal may
be. It seems troublesome indeed to accept that the mere goal of
promoting "the confidence reposed in legal advisers" would suffice to justify a wide privilege - or any privilege at all - intended to prevent adversaries, courts, and law enforcement
agencies from accessing relevant evidence. Building confidence
between people in every walk of life is a worthy goal that could
justify granting confidentiality against compelled disclosure to a
vast array of professionals and business relations, from journalists, psychologists and marriage counsellors to clients, suppliers,
employees, accountants, bankers, tax consultants, and business
advisors. An expectation of confidentiality for communications
with these professionals would foster trust and facilitate the flow
of information at least as much as it does for lawyers. Some of
these professionals require candid communications as much as
lawyers do to discharge their duties correctly. 29 One could even
argue that the social benefits derived from enhanced trust in
these relationships would not be significantly less than the social
benefits derived from enhanced trust in lawyers. After all, many
people go through life without ever needing a lawyer, and most
have only occasional contact with one. By contrast, everyone has
28. See Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege: Fixed Rules, Balancing, and Constitutional
Entitlement, 91 HARv. L. REv. 464, 465 (1977) [hereinafter The Attorney-Client Privilge]; see
also AUBURN, supra note 12, at 15. This view of the privilege is often referred to as
"traditional." See, e.g., Comment, Developments: Privileged Communications, 98 HARv. L.
REv. 1450, 1501 (1985) [hereinafter Developments: Privileged Communications].
29. See Developments: Privileged Communications, supra note 24, at 1230.

20051

PRIVILEGE IN COMPETITION PROCEEDINGS

979

friends or co-workers, deals with banks and tax advisors, is an
employer or an employee, and interacts daily in these relationships. Yet many personal, professional, or business communications are either not protected against disclosure whatsoever, or
are merely covered by ethical, contractual, or legal rules imposing a duty of confidentiality which does not provide a shield
against compelled disclosure in legal proceedings.
Some overriding societal value must therefore be at stake to
make it necessary to promote trust in the lawyer-client relationship over and above trust in most other social contacts. That is,
unless we are satisfied with viewing confidentiality rules and legal
privilege, through the prism of private or special-interest theories, as the result of rent-seeking behavior by a strong interest
group. From this perspective, evidentiary privilege is created
and enforced by lawyers and for lawyers, and is therefore systemically biased to the detriment of the general welfare.3 If we are
not ready to countenance these views, then we must identify
some intrinsic value to distinguish legal communications as specially deserving of the privilege against compelled disclosure.
Such value may be related to the rights and interests of the client, as will be discussed later, but from a purely utilitarian perspective, it cannot be a private interest predominantly or exclusively valuable to the client or to the lawyer. It must necessarily
be one that enhances the welfare of society as a whole in a manner and to an extent that, in the clear majority of cases, compensates for the detrimental effects of non-disclosure on the law-enforcement process. In other words, the utilitarian rationale requires the privilege rule to yield strong collective benefits
capable of outweighing the pernicious effects of non-disclosure,
and to be instrumental in obtaining those benefits.
30. For comments along the line of this "power" or "bias" theory and similar notions, see Developments: Privileged Communications, supra note 24, at 1232-34, nn.41-47
(referring to the lawyers' control of the appropriate decision-making process through
their presence in the judicial and legislative branches, and suggesting that evidentiary
privileges protect relationships favored by "society as the community of lawyers sees it");
see also Developments: Privileged Communications, supra note 28, at 1493-98; Fred C.
Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IowA L. REV. 351, 359-60, 372-74 (1989) (referring to the vested interests of the legal profession, from financial concerns to the psychological comfort of avoiding hard ethical decisions, in devising wide confidentiality
rules). For a general discussion of the economics of professional regulation, as well as a
survey of literature in the field, see K. Kiljanski, Self-Regulation of the Legal Profession
(2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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The obvious answer seems to be that the privilege rests on
the assumption that the confidentiality of legal communications
yields a unique contribution to increased compliance with the
law. If people are able to consult lawyers without having to worry
about the risks of subsequent disclosure of the information revealed and of the legal advice received, lawyers will be sought
more frequently, the advice received will be more accurate, and
the law will be respected more often.3" Note that the utilitarian
view necessarily assumes that legal advice from a well-informed
lawyer will generally be correct, lead the client to respect the law,
and discourage him from contemplated misconduct.
Leaving aside these assumptions for the time being, there is
one striking outcome to this line of reasoning. The utilitarian
rationale as described compels us to introduce a distinction between legal communications related to past conduct and those
referring to a future or contemplated course of action. The logical inference from competent legal advice towards compliance
with the law necessarily implies that the legal advice sought and
given relates to future conduct, or at least to ongoing conduct
that can still be modified. The reverse holds true when the advice deals with the legality of completed conduct; what is done is
done and can no longer be changed. Thus, generally speaking,
significant utilitarian benefits in terms of increased compliance
with the law are not to be expected from the protection of communications involving past conduct.3 2
31. This seems to be the ultimate instrumental goal of the privilege as construed
by the U.S. Supreme Court. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)
(stating that encouraging candor between lawyer and client gives the client an incentive
to consult with counsel more readily as to how she should proceed so as to remain
within the bounds of the law); see also Commodity Futures Trading Commission v.
Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348 (1985) ("the attorney-client privilege serves the function
of promoting full and frank communications between attorneys and their clients. It
thereby encourages observance of the law and aids in the administration ofjustice").
32. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Legal Advice About Acts Already Committed, 10
INr'L REv. L. & ECON. 149 (1990) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Acts Already Committed]
(proposing an economic model for analyzing the effects of advice about sanctionable
past conduct, and finding that advice may be socially irrelevant, desirable, or undesirable, and that the diluting effect of legal advice may be offset by higher sanctions). The
authors show that "legal advice provided after parties act should not be thought, a priori, to channel behavior in accordance with legal rules." Id. at 158. See Steven Shavell,
Legal Advice About Contemplated Acts: The Decision to Obtain Advice, Its Social Desirability,
and Protection of Confidentiality, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND
THE LAW, 516-20 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) [hereinafter Shavell, ContemplatedActs]. According to Shavell, a "notable difference between [ex ante and ex post legal advice] is

20051

PRIVILEGE IN COMPETITION PROCEEDINGS

This reasoning can be taken even further: under a radically
utilitarian approach, there is a case to be made for withdrawing
any privilege whatsoever for legal communications involving completed or even ongoing conduct, and for protecting only communications containing legal advice about future conduct. This
would strongly encourage clients to obtain competent legal advice in advance of any contemplated course of action before it is
completed or even initiated. If we accept the assumptions behind the utilitarian logic, this would result in increased compliance with the law.
To be sure, there is no question about denying the societal
value of the ability to consult a lawyer in confidence about the
legality of past conduct. Under a utilitarian approach, however,
this value cannot be primarily related to expectations about future compliance with the law, since orientation of future conduct is not the main impetus for seeking advice about the legality of past behavior. Legal advice about past actions may of
course pose marginal benefits for future conduct, but only if the
client contemplates repeating the conduct in question.3" The
case for confidentiality under the utilitarian rationale is therefore more relevant to advice on future conduct.
The doctrine of legal privilege in common law jurisdictions
implicitly addresses this weakness by focusing on the distinction
between future and completed conduct in the "future wrongdoing" exception to legal privilege. Under this doctrine, variously
called "crime-fraud," "crime-tort" or "iniquity," lawyer-client
communications are not privileged if the client consults the lawyer to obtain assistance in the engagement of future misconduct. 4 The choice of language here is, of course, charged with
meaning. Though the labels "crime" or "fraud" suggest exthat ex ante advice can channel behavior directly in conformity with law, whereas ex
post advice comes too late to accomplish that." Shavell, Contemplated Acts, supra, at 517.
33. Third parties contemplating similar conduct might also benefit from the exemplary value of advice received by others, although the very confidentiality of legal communications prevents these broader benefits from arising in most cases. Such third
parties may still benefit indirectly from improvements in the quality in legal advice, so
long as their lawyer has advised about similar dealings in the past. This amounts, however, to questioning the premise that legal advice is usually competent. Note also that
this indirect "collective" benefit for future clients of the same lawyer does not apply in
the case of in-house lawyers who only advise their employer.
34. See, e.g., R. v. Cox and Railton, 14 Q.B.D. 153 (1884). For a discussion of the
"crime-fraud" exception in general, see AUBURN, supra note 12, at 150-72 (reviewing
application of the doctrine in common law jurisdictions and examining its theoretical
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tremely serious violations of the law, courts interpret the exception rather broadly to cover all sorts of nefarious acts, including
antitrust violations and even omissions that might not constitute
civil fraud if a lawyer were not involved.35
Obviously, the crime-fraud exception is partly meant to deal
with the lawyer's own unethical behavior, though this is not its
sole rationale. The "future wrongdoing" and "crime-fraud" exceptions do not necessarily require the lawyer's involvement in,
or support for, the client's breach of the law. In most cases, it
suffices that the client's intention was not to learn how to comply
with the law, but how to trump it with the least chance of detection or punishment. It is not necessary for the attorney to be
involved with or even privy to the client's reprehensible intention; he or she may be completely innocent and have no knowledge of the client's purposes. 6 By denying privileged status to
these communications, courts are implicitly acknowledging the
moral hazard problem inherent in protecting confidentiality.
Enabling clients to discuss planned misconduct with impunity
might actually promote misconduct by the lawyer as well as the
client.3 7 The preventive logic inherent in the "future wrongdorationales); see also Note, The Future Crime or Tort Exception to CommunicationsPrivileges,
77 HARv. L. REV. 730 (1964) [hereinafter The Future Crime or Tort Exception].
35. See, e.g., A v. B, 726 A.2d 924 (NJ. 1999). For other examples in the United
States, see In re Sealed Case, 754 F.2d 395, 399 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (dealing with "crime,
fraud or other misconduct"); see also United States v. AT&T, 86 F.R.D. 603, 624-25
(D.D.C. 1979) (dealing with "crime, fraud or tort," including anti-trust violations);
Cooksey v. Hilton Int'l Co., 863 F. Supp. 150, 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (referring to "intentional torts moored in fraud"); Volcanic Gardens Management Co. v. Paxson, 847
S.W.2d 343, 347 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (stating that "fraud" is "much broader" than
common law and criminal fraud, and may include "false suggestions" and "suppression
of truth"); Central Constr. Co. v. Home Indemnity Co., 794 P.2d 595, 598 (Alaska 1990)
("[a]cts constituting fraud are as broad and as varied as the human mind can invent.
Deception and deceit in any form universally connote fraud. Public policy demands
that the 'fraud' exception to the attorney-client privilege . . .be given the broadest
interpretation"); International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. United Tel. Co., 60 F.R.D. 177, 180
(M.D. Fla. 1973) (stating that the differences between prospective crime and prospective action of questionable legality "are differences of degree, not of principle") (quoting Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1103 (5th Cir. 1970)).
36. See U.S. v. Chen, 99 F.3d 1495 (9th Cir. 1996).
37. See Zacharias, supra note 30, at 369. Contra S. Shavell, Legal Advice About ContemplatedActs: The Decision to Obtain Advice, Its Social Desirability,And Protection of Confidentiality, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 123, 129 (1987) ("[1]egal advice can only lead to two types of
changes in behavior: to a party's committing an act that is not sanctionable and that he
would not otherwise have committed ... or to a party's not committing a sanctionable
act that he would otherwise have committed ....
Both these types of changes in behavior are socially desirable").
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ing" exception addresses this problem.
This prophylactic logic might be taken a step further. If the
privilege is instrumental in fostering law-abiding behavior, there
is a theoretical case to be made not only for limiting the privilege to legal communications about contemplated conduct, but
also for requiring that the client effectively follow the advice given.
This follows directly from the assumptions behind the utilitarian
rationale (i.e., that fully informed legal advice is almost always
correct and capable of orienting the client's conduct towards
compliance with the law). Leaving aside for one moment the
practical difficulties of such an approach, it is arguable that limiting the privilege to communications involving advice on future
conduct to cases where the client has effectively followed the lawyer's advice would greatly enhance law-abiding behavior. Clients
seeking legal advice on future conduct would not be deterred
from providing the lawyer with all information necessary, as long
as they intended to act in accordance with the lawyer's advice.
Under the utilitarian rationale, the case for protecting confidentiality is much weaker when the client chooses not to follow the
legal advice received, since refusing privilege under such circumstances would bring about socially desirable consequences. Ex
ante, the prospect of disclosure would encourage clients to follow legal advice while discouraging them from harboring fraudulent intentions. Ex post, disclosure would either expose voluntary misconduct which the client was advised against and could
have avoided, or expose incompetent legal advice. Both these
results would appear to be socially desirable in that both would
contribute to increased compliance with the law (the latter, by
introducing strong incentives for ethical, competent, and reliable legal advice).
Of course, many lawyers will recoil at such a proposal. But
this instinctive rejection does not necessarily follow from the utilitarian justification of the privilege, but from the understanding
that it would result in refusing privileged status for legal communications involving past wrongdoing, or exposing wrongdoing
committed by the client against sound legal advice. This is precisely the type of information which, if disclosed, would be most
harmful to the client's interests. Such a concern is perfectly understandable but not necessarily related to enhancing compliance with the law.
It might be pointed out that future compliance with the law
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is not the only welfare-enhancing goal served by the privilege,
and that shielding lawyer-client communications from compelled disclosure furthers other societal values. Some authors
and courts make references to maintaining the integrity of the
adversarial system or the judicial process, in which case advice
on the legality of past conduct is highly relevant, even more so
than advice about contemplated action. The same is true of correct legal advice on future actions not followed by the client
which, if disclosed, would weaken the client's position in litigation. But such values remain foreign to proper utilitarian balancing in shaping a rule of confidentiality, for they are nothing
else than different labels, cast in the language of collective interests, for the individual rights and interests of the client. The labels "integrity of the adversarial system" and "protection of the
judicial process" convey the notion that client-lawyer communications involving the legality of past conduct deserve to be kept
confidential in order to ensure that the client receives adequate
representation and defense in legal proceedings. Such rights
constitute what we call "due process" or "the right to a fair trial,"
and appear to provide the most robust rationale for extending
privilege to legal advice about past conduct.
One troublesome feature of the traditional utilitarian approach to legal privilege is the lack of empirical data behind
some of its basic assumptions. To accept the modern systemic
arguments in favor of confidentiality, one must reach at least
one of two conclusions: first, that clients would use lawyers significantly less if more exceptions to the privilege existed; second,
that clients who make use of lawyers would reveal substantially
less information.3" This "chilling effect theory" (otherwise
known by its detractors as "the chicken little view" or "the sky is
falling" approach) 9 is typically asserted with little or no empirical corroboration. Nonetheless, the social utility of a rule of confidentiality for lawyer-client communications, and in particular
one preventing compelled disclosure in legal proceedings, depends on the validity of such speculations on the practical impact of the rule on information-sharing between client and lawyer. Appealing and plausible as they may be, it is striking that
they are routinely taken for granted, sometimes in apocalyptic
38. See Zacharias, supra note 30, at 363-64.
39. See AUBURN, supra note 12, at 67.
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terms.4 °
The least that can be said is that something more than mere
intuitive appeal might be expected to justify a rule excluding relevant evidence from law enforcement. If legal privilege must be
grounded in utilitarian balancing, it seems only right to demand
at least some empirical corroboration as well as a more precise
knowledge of the marginal utility to be gained from the expansion of confidentiality to new categories of material, and of the
marginal loss from introducing limitations or exceptions. But
empirical studies are rare, small-scale, and often lacking in statistical significance. 41 There does not appear to have been any survey or report addressing these issues in Europe. Reviewing the
results of the existing U.S. studies, Auburn has concluded that
the privilege is not in fact as important as usually assumed.4 2
For the rational client, the relevance of evidentiary rules
concerning confidentiality and the disclosure of communications may be a function of her knowledge about the risks of disclosure and the private value of foregoing the protection of confidentiality to share information with others.4" There are indications, however, that a significant proportion of clients are either
unaware of the privilege or mistakenly believe that it has no limits. Studies show that clients are willing to candidly disclose information to a variety of lawyer and non-lawyer professionals
under the generic expectation that such communications will remain confidential; whether such confidentiality would be maintained in legal proceedings, however, is never addressed. This
40. See Murphy, supra note 7, at 454 ("[t]here is a real likelihood of companies not
seeking legal advice for fear of possible disclosure of their internal communications to
the Commission. This result could lead to inadvertently engaging in anti-competitive
behavior ....
Or undertakings may simply choose not to trade in Europe if their legal
affairs could be potentially exposed"). Writing about marital privilege, one author suggests that "if the communications privilege were now to be abolished, publicity about
the change might reach large segments of the population .... One might then expect a
decrease in communications between spouses." AUBURN, supra note 12, at 69 (quoting
Comment, Marital Privilege and the Right to Testify, 34 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 196, 200 n.25
(1966)).
41. For an inventory of these studies and an assessment of their results, see AuBURN, supra note 12, at 69-78, 93-96; see also Zacharias, supra note 30, at 376-407.
42. See AUBURN, supra note 12, at 77.

43. See Stephen McG. Bundy & Einer Richard Elhauge, Do Lawyers Improve the Adversary System? A General Theory of Litigation Advice and Its Regulation, 79 CALIF. L. REv.
313, 401-10 (1991); see also Louis Kaplow & Stephen Shavell, Legal Advice About Information to Present in Litigation: Legal Effects and Social Desirability, 102 HARv. L. Rev. 565
(1989).
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may well be an indication that the value of candid disclosure may
be so powerful as to outweigh any perceived risks of disclosure.
If complete frankness is a necessary condition of competent legal representation, many clients find their need for legal assistance so compelling that it leaves them no choice but to talk
candidly.4 4
One thing that emerges clearly from the few existing studies
is a disparity between client expectations and the reality of the
privilege. Lawyers do not always inform their clients about the
extent of the privilege and its possible exceptions, which often
fosters mistaken expectations. This is what Auburn refers to,
rather bluntly, as "wrongful inducement", and what has driven
him to the conclusion that "the law of privilege is built on active
deceit."4 5 It is not necessary to subscribe to such a harsh judgment in order to share the more general concern over the lack
of empirical evidence for the utilitarian rationale. In fact, the
same could be argued about other assumptions supporting the
utilitarian construction of the privilege: the general desirability
of legal advice based on the notion that it leads to increased
compliance with the law, and the belief that the absence of confidentiality would lead to more decisions being taken without legal advice, and thus an increase in illegal conduct. Ultimately,
even the desirability of legal advice itself turns on empirical
46

proof.

Assuming the empirical uncertainty surrounding the utilitarian rationale can be overcome; designing a rule of legal privilege on this basis still raises questions as to its appropriate scope.
Under purely utilitarian logic, the privilege would admit any
construction within a sliding scale of zero to infinity. Whether
dealing with its personal scope or its material reach, the contours of the privilege can be shaped in any manner consistent
with the assumptions of the rationale. One could conclude, for
instance, that extending the privilege to statements made before
third parties,4 7 to the content of any conversation made in the
44. See AUBURN, supra note 12, at 75.
45. Id. at 75. See id. at 94-96 (referring to "wide-scale professional deceit").
46. See BUNDY & ELHAUGE, supra note 43, at 319.
47. The requirement that the statements be made "in confidence" has been
strongly challenged as inadequate. See, e.g., Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege: The
Eroding Concept of Confidentiality Should Be Abolished, 47 DUKE LJ. 853 (1998). The criticism may be valid, at least to the extent that, from a purely utilitarian approach, knowl-
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presence of a lawyer, or to legal discussions with consultants, law
professors, auditors or third-year law students, would all promote
compliance with the law. The utilitarian argument would then
justify extending the privilege to those communications as well.
By the same token, it would be equally admissible to design a
narrower privilege for corporate clients if it turns out that corporations' need for legal advice is so strong and pervasive that limiting the privilege would not significantly impair the flow of information.
The same utilitarian balancing could also be used to determine the material scope of the privilege rule, including how far
to protect such secondary evidence of lawyer-client communications as internal notes within a corporation discussing whether
to follow legal advice. Take, for example, the following notes of
a cartel meeting participant: "I called our lawyer about the following agreement that was made during the meeting ....
I read
it aloud to her and she said that it was illegal." The prospect of
disclosure in this case would certainly discourage the client from
contacting her lawyer. It is not obvious that treating such notes
as privileged enhances compliance with the law; but if it does,
surely a utilitarian approach would recommend protection.
Inherent in the utilitarian view of the privilege is a balancing exercise weighing the instrumental benefits of a given rule
against its costs in terms of lost evidence of wrongdoing. This is
perhaps more appropriately characterized as balancing "policies" rather than "principles," in the sense given these terms by
Dworkin. 48 It may be that deriving a "right of non-disclosure"
and defining its precise material and personal scope on the basis
of policy (or interest) balancing remains a task best left to the
legislature. This is not a charge against judicial originality, but a
edge by certain trusted third parties of communications made for the purposes of obtaining or giving legal advice would not necessarily trump the goals of the privilege.
Contra BUNDY & ELHAUGE, supra note 43, at 409 (stating that the requirement that communications seeking legal advice must be made "in confidence" is consistent with the
notion that there should not be confidentiality protection for information that clients
will normally disclose to lawyers with or without confidentiality).
48. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAXING RIGHTS SERIousLy 22 (1978) (calling "policy" the
kind of standard "that sets out a goal to be reached, generally an improvement in some
economic, political, or social feature of the community," and "principle" a standard
"that is to be observed, not because it will advance or secure an economic, political, or
social situation deemed desirable, but because it is a requirement of justice or fairness
or some other dimension of morality").
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misgiving that common law judges appear to share, at least in
the area of evidentiary privilege.49 The common law offers no
privilege to any other professional group apart from lawyers;
most other privileges have therefore been introduced by legislative action.5 0 In civil-law countries, on the other hand, all privileges against compelled testimony are expressly provided for in
legislation, and sometimes even in the constitution.5 1 In many
cases, the legitimacy of a judicially created rule derives from having originated in principle rather than policy. Policy-based arguments justify political decisions by showing that they advance or
protect some collective goal of the community as a whole; arguments of principle, however, justify political decisions by demonstrating that they respect or secure some individual or group
right.5 2 Difficult cases often require judges to extract a rule of
law by balancing competing principles; conversely, extracting a
rule from balancing competing policies is more appropriately
the realm of the legislature. While judges are often confronted
with the need to accommodate competing values in applying existing rules and standards to individual cases, they are rightly
wary of stepping into a broader balancing exercise between different public policy interests at the stage of defining the rule
itself.
The developments above show that, even as the law stands
in the EU today, attempts at justifying legal privilege under a
purely utilitarian view remain problematic. Strict confidentiality
rules rest on assertions concerning the effects of rules on clients,
the validity of which necessarily depends on empirical research.
Extending legal privilege in competition proceedings before the
European Commission on the basis of its alleged instrumental
benefits may well be envisaged, but it seems a task best left to the
legislature. In fact, determining the scope of the privilege has
become a major issue within recent EU legislation. The possibil49. Of course the issue presents itself differently in common law jurisdictions
where, given the broad scope of legal privilege, arguments for or against judicial intervention often refer to the introduction of new exceptions to (rather than extensions of)
the privilege. Even so, common law judges express uneasiness when called to define
the scope of further limitations. See AuBuRN, supra note 12, at 135-45 (summarizing
arguments for and against judicial intervention in defining new exceptions to the privilege).
50. See, e.g., FunctionalOverlap, supra note 24, at 1227, 1229, n.21.
51. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
52. See DwoRIUN, supra note 48, at 82.
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ity of extending legal privilege to in-house lawyers, for example,
was raised in the European Parliament over the course of its
adoption of Regulation 1/2003. The Evans report on the Commission's proposal, as adopted in the Economic and Monetary
Committee of the European Parliament, foresaw an Amendment
(No. 10) providing that "[c]ommunications between a client
and outside or in-house counsel containing or seeking legal advice shall be privileged provided that the legal counsel is properly qualified and complies with adequate rules of professional
ethics and discipline."5 In the plenary session, however, the
Amendment was rejected by a vote of 404 to 69, with 9 abstentions.5 4 This does not necessarily mean that legislative extension
of legal privilege ought to be discarded. But caution is warranted, and further initiatives in this direction would benefit
greatly from empirical evidence on the likely effects of expanding the privilege beyond its current confines.
B. Privilege as a Fundamental Right
An alternative approach to legal privilege is to construe it as
an individual entitlement, a right to confidentiality bestowed
upon the client and disconnected from utilitarian balancing.
Under this view, the privilege against compelled disclosure of
certain legal communications exists, not because of its instrumental value in furthering collective societal goals, but because
of its inherent subjective value for the holder of the right.
Rights are not instrumentally derived and therefore do not depend for their force upon balancing public policies.5 5 Without
doubt, the most powerful and far-reaching construction of privilege-as-a-right is based on fundamental rights, which are not susceptible to balancing against general policy interests and are
therefore likely to prevail in any given conflict with other
rights.5 6 I use "fundamental rights" here as a generic tag for
53. European Parliament Session Doc. of 21 June 2001, A5-0229/2001 Final, PE
296.005, at 65-66 (Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs) (on the proposal for
a Council regulation on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in
Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty and amending Regulations (EEC) No 1017/68, (EEC)
No 2988/74, (EEC) No 4056/86 and (EEC) No 3975/87).
54. See Minutes of European Parliament Plenary Session of 6 September 2001, PE
308.749, at 35-37 (Provisional Edition), available at http://www3.europarl.eu.int/calen
dar/calendar?APP=PDF&TYPE=PV1&FILE=20010906EN.pdf&LANGUE=EN.
55. See The Attorney-Client Privilege, supra note 28, at 480.
56. See DwoRxJN, supra note 48, at 92 (stating that rights, by definition, cannot be

990

FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 28:967

those rights whose inherent value requires them to prevail over
generic societal goals, important as they may be. Severing the
hands of managers participating in a cartel, or establishing an
arbitrary process without due respect for the rights of the defense, might well prove frightening enough to encourage compliance with the law. Yet debate over such proposals would not
even be countenanced, because they represent gross violations
of individual rights deemed sufficiently fundamental as to prevail against broad social interests. Only minimal interference
with such rights may be warranted, and only under extremely
limited circumstances.
One variation of privilege-as-a-right is clearly the construction adopted by the Court of Justice in AM&S, in which protection of the confidentiality of lawyer-client communications was
construed as a necessary requirement of the client's right to a
fair trial. Another possibility is to view legal privilege as an emanation of the client's fundamental right to privacy.
1. Privacy
People desire a sphere of freedom from public exposure,
and value, as an end in itself, the ability to keep their affairs protected from scrutiny and interference, especially by public authorities. Although "privacy" is an elusive concept, it is generally
accepted that it goes further than a right to voluntary seclusion
or "to be left alone," but that it is inextricably linked to the unfettered development of human personality. This is undoubtedly how the European Court of Human Rights has construed it:
"private life . . . includes a person's physical and psychological
integrity . . . and is primarily intended to ensure the development, without outside interference, of the personality of each
individual in his relations with other human beings."5 7
Communications with a lawyer may well be part of what one
outweighed by all social goals, categorizing rights as "absolute" or "less than absolute,"
and proposing to define the "weight of a right" as its power to withstand competition
from other individual rights and collective goals); see also id. at 191 (suggesting that
governmental measures limiting liberty are usuallyjustified if they increase general utility in which "the gains to the many will justify the inconvenience to the few," but not
when they interfere with certain "fundamental" moral rights against the government).
57. Niemietz v. Germany, [1992] 16 Eur. Ct. H.R. 97, 29 ("it would be too restrictive to limit the notion [of private life] to an 'inner circle' in which the individual may
live his own personal life as he chooses and to exclude therefrom entirely the outside
world not encompassed within that circle. Respect for private life must also comprise to
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may legitimately wish to keep within the realm of private life,
protected not only from disclosure in legal proceedings but
from the view of strangers in general. This view, in turn, would
help dissociate the privilege-as-a-right from the limitations of the
rights of defense. After all, the need for protection against disclosure of embarrassing or unpleasant information, or even information that one wishes to remain private, is not confined to
the realm of legal proceedings.
Again, it is important not to confound legal privilege with
related legal constructs imposing confidentiality duties in lawyerclient relationships. Protecting the client's expectation of privacy may well play a role in justifying the broad application of
these rules well beyond the requirements of the rights of defense. Preserving client privacy may also help explain the extent
of lawyer confidentiality obligations as well as the gravity of the
legal consequences for their breach. Note that a violation of
confidentiality obligations may occur in the absence of any connection with legal proceedings, and yet still give rise to civil or
criminal liability. Legal privilege, in contrast, operates not as a
sword but as a shield against the compelled production of evidence (or against the admissibility of evidence) in legal proceedings. It is, in this sense, a rule of evidence." Privilege can only
be "breached" by the disclosure of evidence in legal proceedings, and only then by the adjudicator who wrongly rejects a
valid claim of legal privilege. Privacy rights can therefore not be
the rationale for a privilege altogether disconnected from legal
proceedings, for the simple reason that legal privilege has no
existence or meaning outside legal proceedings.5 9
As a rationale for legal privilege proper (i.e., for a rule
a certain degree the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings"). See Botta v. Italy, [1998] 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. 241
32.
58. Judgments and authors often state that the privilege is not "a mere rule of
evidence" and that it has reached the status of a "substantive right." The point is of
little practical relevance unless it reflects support for a rights-based approach. See AuBURN, supra note 12, at 31-32 (dismissing the issue as "a red herring"). Contra Wolfram,
supra note 12, at 540 n.34 (lamenting "that most American pop jurisprudential rallying
cr[y] - the invocation of rights," and suggesting that it results from a "rights-compulsive, selfish view of the world") (citing MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991)).

59. See, e.g.,
Parry-Jones v. Law Society, [19691 1 Ch. 1, 9 ("privilege, of course, is
irrelevant when one is not concerned with judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings because, strictly speaking, privilege refers to a right to withhold from a court, or a tribunal
exercisingjudicial functions, material which would otherwise be admissible in evidence.
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preventing compelled disclosure in law-enforcement proceedings), the right to privacy has major shortcomings. On the one
hand, it provides no explanation for favoring communications
with lawyers over and above other private communications.
Since lawyer-client communications cannot be presumed to be
the most intimate type of social intercourse, 60 the privacy rationale is incapable ofjustifying special protection denied to other
relationships. Contrary to such privileges as that preventing the
compelled testimony of certain close relatives, legal privilege
does not concern itself with facilitating the flow of personal or
intimate communications, nor is it concerned with sparing the
client from public exposure. Secrecy is not sought as an end in
itself, in fact, much of the information communicated to the lawyer eventually comes to light in legal proceedings anyway. An
essential part of the lawyer's task in litigation consists in selecting, using, and disclosing that information which he or she believes will support the client's position. Thus, the goal of the
privilege is not so much to preserve the private sphere of the
client from exposure, as it is to preserve the free selection of
information from that provided by the client. Information
deemed beneficial will be disclosed, and information deemed
damaging will be kept secret. There is no reason to assume,
however, that information detrimental to the client's position in
legal proceedings presents a more direct connection with the client's private sphere than favorable information.
Anchoring legal privilege in the need to safeguard the client's expectation of privacy is also difficult to reconcile with the
operation of some exceptions to the privilege or, more generally, to lawyer confidentiality duties. The disclosure of lawyerclient communications to other persons in the same law firm is
generally permitted, as is disclosure to collect a fee or to defend
the lawyer or the lawyer's associates against allegations of malpractice or misconduct. 6 Yet such disclosures are at least as inWhat we are concerned with here is the contractual duty of confidence, generally implied though sometimes expressed, between a solicitor and client").
60. See The Attorney-Client Privilege, supra note 28, at 483 (comparing the intimacy of
attorneys and their clients to that of "friends and lovers").
61. See Parry-Jones, [1969] 1 Ch. 1 (holding that the Law Society was entitled to
inspect a solicitor's books and supporting documents in order to ascertain whether the
Solicitors' Accounts and Trust Accounts Rules were being complied with, even if it
meant disclosing the client's affairs, thereby overriding any privilege or confidence
which might otherwise subsist between solicitor and client).
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jurious to the client's privacy rights as disclosures against the client herself in the context of legal proceedings. The privacy rationale also fails to explain the strict requirement, typical in
common law jurisdictions, according to which privilege is lost if
the communication is not made "in confidence." Under a privacy rationale, the presence of a trusted third party should not
take the communication outside the private sphere.
Considering legal privilege solely in terms of the client's generic expectation of having his matters remain private would
probably result in weaker protection than viewing it as a corollary of the rights of defense. Compelled production of evidence
in legal proceedings rests precisely on the notion that truth-seeking requires us to tolerate a limited invasion of a sphere that
individuals would prefer to keep secret. Law enforcement has
developed tools and instruments to accommodate privacy interests by means that do not entail the suppression of evidence,
such as exceptions to the publicity of proceedings and limited
disclosure.6 2 At least within the strict confines of the law enforcement process, however, relevant evidence is rarely excluded
from scrutiny purely on the basis of privacy concerns, even when
the assault on privacy is severe.6 3
In the context of inspections by a competition authority,
there is little doubt that an inspection of the private home of a
director, manager, or employee of an undertaking 64 is far more
invasive than the copying of legal memoranda pertaining to the
business activities of the undertaking. Yet the law allows unannounced inspections at private homes. A privilege based on the
privacy rationale would be eminently receptive to balancing the
62. See, e.g., European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [hereinafter European Convention], Sept. 3, 1953, art. 6(1), 213
U.N.T.S. 221, 228 (providing that "everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing...
[in which] L]udgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be
excluded from all or part of the trial . . . where the protection of the private life of the
parties so require[s], or to the extent necessary in the opinion of the court in special
circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice").
63. Situations involving particularly severe invasions of privacy may include paternity tests, child abuse investigations, body searches, character testimony, telephone tapping, or searches at private homes.
64. Inspections at non-business premises, including private homes of directors,
managers, and employees, are possible with judicial authorization under Article 21 of
Regulation No. 1/2003. See Regulation No. 1/2003, supra note 19, art. 21, O.J. L 1/15,
at 15 (2003).
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need for privacy against the need for evidence. 6 5 Given that business and professional documents (as opposed to personal matters and correspondence) are the central target of competition
investigations, the invasion of privacy ought to be relatively limited in the overwhelming majority of cases. The case for confidentiality, if based on privacy, would therefore often be weak.
Were the protection of the client's privacy the paramount concern, it would hardly justify pulling a curtain over evidence relevant to an investigation about serious wrongdoing, even less so if
that evidence consists of legal opinions and memoranda.
Recourse to privacy as an alternative basis for the privilege
would also open the door to a distinction between individual
and corporate clients. Protection of privacy derives in great part
from a concern for such human feelings as guilt, shame, embarrassment, and anxiety, all difficult to ascribe to corporations. Although the notion of private life extends to some activities of a
professional or business nature,6 6 corporations arguably have a
weaker claim to privacy than individuals. This is recognized
even by staunch defenders of a role for the privacy rationale in
shaping legal privilege,6 7 and is supported by authority in European law.6" Construing the doctrine of legal privilege as essen65. See Developments: Privileged Communications, supra note 28, at 1482-83, n.73 (stating that "[t]he privacy interest must always be balanced against society's interest in ascertaining the truth", and noting that "[e]ven proponents of the privacy rationale concede that privacy must always be balanced against other interests").
66. See Niemietz v. Germany, [1992] 16 Eur. Ct. H.R. 80,
29 ("it is, after all, in
the course of their working lives that the majority of people have a significant, if not the
greatest, opportunity of developing relationships with the outside world"); see also
Halford v. United Kingdom, [1997] 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. 523,
42-46; Kopp v. Switzerland,
[1999] 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 91; Amann v. Switzerland, [2000] 30 Eur. Ct. H.R., 843, 9 6567; Rotaru v. Romania, [2000-V] Eur. Ct. H.R.,
43; Colas Est and Others v. France,
[2002-II] App. No. 37971/97, 41. The European Commission of Human Rights has
stated that an individual's right to interrelate socially with others is also part of the right
to develop and fulfil one's own personality. See McFeeley v. United Kingdom, [1980] 3
Eur. H.R. Rep. 161,
82A.
67. See Developments: Privileged Communications, supra note 28, at 1482.
68. See Niemietz, 16 Eur. Ct. H.R., 31 (holding that the right of interference established by Article 8(2) of the European Convention "might well be more far-reaching
where professional or business activities or premises were involved than would otherwise be the case"). The Court had never recognized a "right to privacy" for legal persons until Colas Est. See Colas Est, [2002-II] App. No. 37971/97, 41 (holding that the
rights guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention could "in certain circumstances" be
construed as including the right to respect for a company's head office, branch office,
or place of business). There is a related general principle of EC law ensuring protection against disproportionate or arbitrary intervention by the public authorities in the
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tially founded on the human need for privacy would potentially
lead to a "dual-track" privilege in which corporate clients would
take the back seat, a conclusion defensible from a utilitarian perspective as well.6 9 This is particularly relevant in competition
proceedings before the European Commission, which contains
no provision for the prosecution of natural persons. 70 But if legal privilege is viewed as a necessary component of the rights of
defense, there is no discernible distinction to be made between
corporate and individual defendants.
It therefore appears that the type of client "privacy" protected by the privilege is a very specific one, directed solely at the
privacy of communications with a lawyer that is essential to ensure that the client is able to exercise his rights of defense in
legal proceedings. We value that privacy, not as an end in itself,
but because it is necessary for a proper exercise of the rights of
defense. It is difficult to see what the privacy rationale would
add to the notion of the privilege as a corollary of the rights of
defense. For even from a purely utilitarian perspective, the privilege seeks to encourage communications conveying one specific
category of information only: information potentially harmful
sphere of the private activities of any person, whether natural or legal. See, e.g., Hoechst
v. Commission,Joined Cases 46/87 & 227/88, [1989] E.C.R. 2859, 19; Dow Benelux v.
Commission, Case 85/87, [1989] E.C.R. 3137, 30; Minoan Lines v. Commission, Case
T-66/99, (CFI Dec. 2003) (not yet reported),
49. However, this right may be more
limited for corporations than for natural persons. See Roquette Freres v. Directeur gen6ral de la Concurrence, Case C-94/00, [2002] E.C.R. 1-9011,
29; Hoechst, [1989]
E.C.R.,
17-19. Indeed, Article 21 of Regulation 1/2003, which introduces the possibility of conducting inspections in private homes, subjects these to specific and more
stringent requirements. See Regulation No. 1/2003, supra note 19, art. 21, O.J. L 1/15,
at 15 (2003).
69. See supra note 47 and accompanying text; see also The Attorney-Client Privilege,
supra note 28, at 473-77 (applying a balancing model to the corporate client-attorney
privilege and arguing that "corporate claims present the clearest occasions for abandoning a fixed rule of protection").
70. The application of EU competition rules to individuals is not entirely excluded, as is the case with "undertakings," an economic notion which does not necessarily exclude natural persons. There is even anecdotal presence of such "one-person
undertakings" in case law and Commission practice. See, e.g., Hydrotherm v. Compact,
Case 170/83, [1984] E.C.R. 2999, 1 10-12 (regarding an individual and the firms
under his personal control); Commission Decision No. 76/743/EEC, OJ. L 157/39
(1976) (regarding an individual "exploiting the results of his own research and [acting]
as commercial adviser to third parties"); Commission Decision No. 78/516/EEC, O.J. L
157/39 (1978) (dealing with opera singers); Commission Decision No. 76/29/EEC,
O.J. L 6/8, at 12 (1976) (regarding an inventor). Note, however, that Commission
investigations targeting individuals trading as such (as opposed to trading through a
corporate form) are sufficiently rare to make this hypothesis negligible.
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to the client's legal position and which the client would therefore be reluctant to convey to the lawyer without an expectation
of confidentiality. In a rights-based construction, the privacy rationale is instrumental to, and may be subsumed within, the
rights of defense rationale.7 1
2. Rights of Defense
The discussion about the privacy rationale above is not necessarily contradicted by the fact that, in legal systems where the
confidentiality of lawyer-client communications does not have a
specific constitutional or legislative basis, it has been derived
from provisions, often of constitutional rank, protecting the privacy of personal communications. Compulsory evidence-taking
of any kind is by definition an invasion of "privacy"; it is therefore entirely natural that the law should take this as a starting
point. The real question is whether privacy is to be protected as
an end in itself or as a means to preserve some other value.
When legal communications between lawyer and client are at
stake, the answer may well be that the need for privacy is instrumental to the effective exercise of the rights of defense. Communications between lawyer and client do not deserve privacy
because they belong to an individual's private life, but because
disclosure would compromise the rights of defense.
This may be illustrated by reference to the case law of the
European Court of Human Rights. While the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms ("ECHR")7 2 does not expressly guarantee the right to
71. There have been proposals to incorporate privacy, together with any other rationale for the privilege, in a "full utilitarian balancing," where "individual privacy interests and non-individuated societal interests may together outweigh the costs of a particular privilege, even if neither alone could outweigh them." Developments: Privileged Communications, supra note 28, at 1484-86, n.91. When examining a "rights" approach to
legal privilege, however, there seems to be little added value in considering "privacy"
not as an alternative rationale, but as a supplementary one. The rights of defense incor-

porate fully the entire weight of privacy considerations relevant to justify legal privilege.
72. The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on Nov. 4, 1950, guarantees a number of substantive
rights, and establishes institutions and remedies for their protection. See European Convention, supra note 62. Under the Convention, a European Court of Human Rights
hears appeals by individual citizens against governments of the contracting parties,
seeking a declaration that a violation of fundamental rights has occurred as well as
appropriate compensation. All 45 Member States of the Council of Europe are parties
to the Convention, including the 25 Member States of the European Union. For a table
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communicate privately with defense counsel, several judgments
have nonetheless recognized a right to the confidentiality of
communications between lawyer and client. These judgments
are primarily grounded in the right to a fair trial under Article
6. 7 1 Otherjudgments base the requirement of confidentiality on
the right to respect for private and family life, home, and correspondence under Article 8.7' These latter cases, however, have
involved legal communications with little "privacy intensity" in
themselves; it seems that a heightened level of protection under
Article 8 was justified only in order to safeguard another fundamental right. The European Court of Human Rights was clearly
of this view in Niemietz, in which it expressly rejected any specificity to lawyer-client communications for the purposes of Article 8
taken in isolation, stating that:
[t]he Commission attached particular significance to the confidential relationship that exists between lawyer and client.
The Court shares the Government's doubts as to whether this
factor can serve as a workable criterion for the purposes of
delimiting the scope of the protection afforded by Article 8.
Virtually all professional and business activities may involve,
to a greater or lesser degree, matters that are confidential,
with the result that, if that criterion were adopted, disputes
would frequently arise as to where the line should be drawn.
...Where a lawyer is involved, an encroachment on professional secrecy may have repercussions on the proper administration of justice and hence on the rights guaranteed by Article 6 [the right to a fair trial]. 75
A statement to the same effect can be found in Kopp v. Switzerland, another Article 8 case concerning the monitoring of a
indicating the dates of ratification and entry into force of the Convention for each
contracting party, see http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/EDocs/DatesOfRatifications.html.
73. See S. v. Switzerland, [1991] 220 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 14,
48.
74. It is noteworthy that these cases related to the interception of correspondence
of prisoners with their legal advisers. See, e.g., Foxley v. United Kingdom, [2000] App.
33274/96; Campbell v. United Kingdom, [1992] 233 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A); Labita v.
Italy, [2000-IV] App. 26772/95 (unreported); A.B. v. Netherlands, [2002] Eur. Ct. H.R.
9 (dealing with interception of inmate's correspondence with the European Commission of Human Rights and the representative of the applicant in proceedings before the
Commission). In Niemietz, the Court found a violation of Article 8 on the grounds that
an extensive search in the law office of the applicant, though pursuing a legitimate aim,
was disproportionate in view of the alleged offense under investigation. See Niemietz v.
Germany, [1992] 16 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 97.
75. Niemietz, 16 Eur. Ct. H.R.,
28, 37.
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lawyer's telephone lines. While finding a violation of the lawyer's right to respect for his private life, the Court emphasized
that strong safeguards should be in place when a lawyer is being
monitored as a "third party" (as opposed to a suspect). Precautions should therefore be taken not to interfere with legal professional privilege in "matters specifically connected with a law76
yer's work under instructions from a party to proceedings."
The Court also stressed the need to protect "this sensitive area of
the confidential relations between a lawyer and his clients, which
directly concern the rights of the defense. ' 77 In Erdem v. Germany, the Court again affirmed that the confidentiality between
a prisoner and his counsel touched directly upon the former's
rights of defense and could therefore only be authorized in exceptional circumstances and with adequate safeguards.7 8 Thus,
the case law of the European Court of Human Rights offers
strong support for a construction of legal privilege firmly
anchored in the rights of defense.
Two fundamental rights are relevant to a configuration of a
legal privilege based on the rights-of-defense rationale: the right
to effective representation ("right to counsel") and the right
against self-incrimination. Both of these rights have a basis in
Article 6 of the ECHR.7 9

Article 6(3) (c) clearly provides a basis for the right to be
assisted by a lawyer. Although confidentiality of communications is not expressly guaranteed, 8° the Court has recognized in
76. Kopp v. Switzerland, [1999] 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 91,
73-74.
77. Id.
78. See Erdem v. Germany, [2001] App. 38321/97,
65.
79. See European Convention, supra note 62, art. 6:
1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal
charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law
2. Everyone charged with a criminal offense shall be presumed innocent until
proved guilty according to law.
3. Everyone charged with a criminal offense has the following minimum
rights . . . (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his
defense; [and] (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of
his own choosing, or if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance,
to be given it free when the interests of justice so require.
80. The European Convention differs in this regard from the American Convention on Human Rights: "Pacto de San Jos6 de Costa Rica," which recognizes "the right
of the accused to defend himself personally or to be assisted by legal counsel of his own
choosing, and to communicate freely and privately with his counsel." See American Con-
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S. v. Switzerland that:
[a]n accused's right to communicate with his advocate out of
hearing of a third person is part of the basic requirements of
a fair trial in a democratic society and follows from Article
6(3) (c) of the Convention. If a lawyer were unable to confer
with his client and receive confidential instructions from him
without such. surveillance, his assistance would lose much of
its usefulness, whereas the Convention is intended
to guaran8
tee rights that are practical and effective. '

Note that this judgment refers to the right of "an accused." Although Article 6 of the ECHR concerns the adjudication of civil
rights and obligations or criminal charges "by a tribunal," Article
6(3) refers only to those charged with a "criminal offense," suggesting that the right to counsel is clearly relegated to the preparation of the client's defense. A question therefore arises as to
exactly what point in time the right to counsel comes into existence. As for criminal proceedings, Article 6(3) appears to guarantee this right, not only during the trial, but from the moment
that charges are formally brought. But the right to counsel may
arise even before a formal accusation. In Imbroscia v. Switzerland, 2 for instance, the Court relied on precedent applying Article 6 guarantees to pre-trial proceedings.8 3 In Murray v. United
Kingdom,8 4 the Court confirmed that Article 6 even applies to the
preliminary investigation into an offense by the police. Under
the Court's construction, however, the right to be assisted by a
lawyer only arises automatically from the accusation; while durvention on Human Rights: Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 8(d), 1144
U.N.T.S. 123, 145 (entered into force July 18, 1978).
81. S. v. Switzerland, 220 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), 9 46-51.
82. See Imbroscia v. Switzerland, 275 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A),
36 (1993).
83. Imbroscia makes reference for example, to the case law on the concept of "reasonable time," which begins to run from the moment a "charge" comes into being,
within the autonomous, substantive meaning of that term. See id. 1 1; see also Wemhoff
v. Germany, [1968] 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 55,
19; Messina v. Italy, [1993] 257 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A), 25; Maj v. Italy, [1991] 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. 405, 9 13-15a (finding reasonable
time to have been exceeded in a case that ended with a discharge); Viezzer v. Italy,
[1991] 196 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A),
15-17 (finding a reasonable time to have been
exceeded at the investigation stage). Other requirements of Article 6 (especially those
of Paragraph 3) may also be relevant before a case is sent for trial, if and insofar as the
fairness of the trial is likely to be seriously prejudiced by an initial failure to comply with
them. See, e.g., Delta v. France, [1990] 191 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A),
36 ; Quaranta v.
Switzerland, [1991] 205 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), 91 28, 36; S. v. Switzerland, 220 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A), 91 46-51.
84. See Murray v. United Kingdom, [1996] 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 29, 9162.
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ing the preliminary investigation, "the manner in which Article
6(3) (c) is to be applied ...

depends on the special features of

the proceedings involved and on the circumstances of the
case."8 5 According to the Court in Murray, where national law
attaches consequences to the attitude of an accused at the initial
stages of police interrogation which are decisive for the prospects of the defense in subsequent criminal proceedings, Article
6 requires that "the accused be allowed to benefit from the assistance of a lawyer already at the initial stages of police interrogation.

'86

It is possible to summarize the ECHR case law on legal privilege as follows: there appears to be an automatic right to counsel, with an attendant right to communicate with counsel in private, starting from the moment charges are brought against a
person. During preliminary investigations, the existence of a
right to counsel is no longer automatic, and will be strongly dependent on the type of proceedings and the circumstances of
the case. In general, a right to counsel is recognized where absence of legal representation would risk compromising the accused's other rights of defense. Before an investigation has begun, there is no basis in Article 6(3) (c) on which to assert a fundamental "right to counsel" or a concomitant right to
confidentiality of communications. Finally, confidentiality is
guaranteed concerning "matters specifically connected with a
lawyer's work under instructions from a party to proceedings."8 7
It seems also that the ECHR is not prepared to find an automatic violation of Article 6 whenever confidentiality of communications with defense counsel is not assured. In Labita v. Italy,
although interferences with the correspondence of an accused
constituted a breach of Article 8, the Court rejected the applicant's Article 6 claim concerning the same interference specifically affecting his correspondence with defense counsel. The
judgment offers two grounds for its rejection of this claim: first,
that the Article 6 claim was "absorbed" within the Article 8 violation; second, that "the applicant has not stated in what way his
defense was adversely affected by the censorship of his corre85. Id. See Imbroscia, 275 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A),
38.
86. Murray, [1996] 22 Eur. H.R. Rep.,
63.
87. Kopp v. Switzerland, [1999] 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 91,
26772/95,
184, 186-88.

7 73-74. See Labita, App.
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88
spondence with his lawyer."
Against this background, it is possible to draw a general inference regarding legal privilege. Assuming that secrecy of communications is a necessary corollary of the right to counsel as
construed by the ECHR, it appears that no right to confidentiality of lawyer-client communications arises from Article 6 where a
fundamental right to be assisted by a lawyer does not exist.8 9 By
the same token, confidentiality must be protected in every situation where a right to counsel arises and with respect to all communications passing between lawyer and client from that point
onwards.
Finally, a full picture of the rights of defense relevant to legal privilege would not be complete without reference to the
right against self-incrimination. In Saunders v. United Kingdom"0
and Funke v. France,1 the ECHR accepted that the right to silence and the right not to incriminate oneself, though not specifically mentioned in the Convention, are an inherent part of
the right to a fair hearing under Article 6.92
The justification for an absolute privilege for communications passing between a criminal defendant and counsel after
charges have been brought is clear. A large part of defense
counsel's task is to elicit information from the client in order to

88. Labita v. Italy, [2000-IV] App. 26772/95, 1 188 (unreported). The Court also
notes as relevant the fact that the applicant was finally acquitted at the end of the proceedings in question.
89. Some protection (i.e., that of private life) may still arise under Article 8. As
stated above, however, the Court has rejected any specificity of lawyer-client communications for the purposes of Article 8, deriving increased protection of privacy in the case
of lawyer-client communications from Article 6 instead. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
90. See Saunders v. United Kingdom, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 313, 11 68-69 (1996); see
also COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES

1994, it 71-73 (1994).
44 (1993).
91. See Funke v. France, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 297,
45. Article 14(3) (g) of the United Nations
92. See Murray, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep.,
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights explicitly provides that an accused
shall "not be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt." See International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp.
No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171. Article 55(2)(b) of the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court qualifies the right to silence with the
words "without such silence being a consideration in the determination of guilt or innocence." See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 55(2) (b), U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 183/9 (1998). For a discussion of the right against self-incrimination in EU
competition proceedings, see W. Wils, Self-Incrimination in EC Antitrust Enforcement: A
Legal and Economic Analysis, 26 WORLD COMPETITION 567 (2003).
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
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determine the best defense strategy. A competent defense requires the lawyer to be particularly aware of any incriminating
information. The privilege is of little relevance for "favorable"
information: as stated above, part of the lawyer's task is to select
facts and information supporting the client's defense and to disclose them as convincingly as possible to the adjudicator. 3 But a
fair trial also requires that the lawyer be aware of any information damaging to his client's case. Unconstrained access by the
lawyer to incriminating information in the possession of the client is, in reality, what the privilege seeks to protect. Compelling,
or even allowing, the lawyer to disclose incriminating information would be an intrusion into the defendant's defense camp,
tantamount to denying him the right to a lawyer.9 4 Without privilege, the defendant would face an impossible dilemma: "to preserve his right against self-incrimination, the defendant would
have to forgo communicating with an attorney," yet "to enjoy
even the most minimal use of his right to an attorney; the defendant would have to surrender his testimony to the court."9 This
is why all civilized legal systems allow defendants the opportunity
to reveal everything to one person and nobody else, without fear
that what they say could be used against them. To deny this
right would taint the adversarial system itself.
Hence, the two sides of legal privilege go hand in hand as
both a necessary corollary of the defendant's right to counsel
and as a condition to his right against self-incrimination.9 6 This
is the essence of legal privilege construed as a right of the de93. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
94. See generally Note, Government Intrusions Into the Defense Camp: Undermining the
Right to Counsel, 97 HARv. L. Rav. 1143 (1984).
95. The Attorney-Client Privilege, supra note 28, at 486. Contra Simmons v. United
States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968) (stating that it would be "intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to assert another").
96. U.S. readers may find this line of argument reminiscent of the opinion in Radiant Burners v. American Gas Association, 207 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Ill. 1962), rev'd, 320
F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963) ("[i]n its historic genesis in the common law [the right to
counsel] is so intimately entwined with its great partner, the privilege against self incrimination, that a person reading its history begins to doubt that two separate privileges ever were originally intended. Rather the one seems to be but an extension and
outgrowth of the other"). ChiefJustice Campbell's view of the privilege was incompatible with its extension to corporations because, among other reasons, they have no recognized Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. See Braswell v. United
States, 487 U.S. 99 (1988); see also United States v. White 322 U.S. 694, 698-99 (1944).
This is not the case in EC law, where companies have a certain degree of protection
against self-incrimination. See, e.g., Orkem v. Commission, Case 374/87, [1989] E.C.R.
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fense, the consequences of which are twofold. On the one hand,
the confidentiality of lawyer-client communications has a
stronger claim to absoluteness than would be the case under alternative rationales. Under exceptional circumstances, to be
sure, it may still be legitimately superseded by interests deemed
strong enough to take precedence; 9 7 generally speaking, however, it admits no interference whatsoever and is not amenable
to balancing in individual cases. On the other hand, no right to
confidentiality arises before the start of an investigation liable to
result in an accusation. Lawyer-client communications outside
the framework of the relationship between a defendant accused
of serious wrongdoing and his counsel remain, of course, covered by strict confidentiality obligations; as part of an individual's private life, they deserve particular protections against arbitrary disclosure. Under the logic of the rights-of-defense rationale, however, they are not privileged against the compulsory
taking of evidence required by the needs of law enforcement.
If this reading is correct, the protection granted under
AM&S not only satisfies, but actually goes beyond the requirements set for legal privilege by the ECHR. According to the
Court of Justice in AM&S, the privilege covers "all written communications exchanged after the initiation of the administrative
procedure," which is equivalent to the "bringing of charges"
under the Convention. As for earlier communications, the
Court affirmed the possibility of extending the privilege to documents having "a relationship to the subject matter of that proce3283, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 502; Mannesmannr6hren-Werke v. Commission, Case T-112/
98, [2001] ECR 11-729. See also infra note 98 and accompanying text.
97. One such example is the statutory abrogation of the legal professional privilege in the United Kingdom under the Children Act 1989, under which the "paramount interests of the child" limit operation of the privilege (and of the litigation privilege) in Children Act proceedings. See In Re L, [1997] AC 1 (H.L. 1997); see also AuBURN, supra note 12, at 8, 130-31. The Children Act also limits the right to silence. See
id. at 87, n.59. The Court of Appeals found a similar abrogation involving tax inspections under Section 20(7) of the Taxes Management Act 1970. See Regina v. Special
Commissioner & Another, ex parte Morgan Grenfell & Co Ltd., [2003] 1 AC 563 (C.A.
2001). The judgment, however, was reversed on appeal to the House of Lords. See
Regina v. Special Commissioner & Another, ex parte Morgan Grenfell & Co Ltd.,
[2003] 1 AC 563 (H.L. 2002); see also Council Directive No. 2001/97, O.J. L 344/76
(2001) (amending Directive No. 91/308 on prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering, to establish inter alia a duty for certain professionals, including lawyers, to report suspicious transactions concerning the affairs of
their clients to the authorities).
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dure." g In this case, the privilege was held to cover communications which had been passed well before the beginning of the
investigation, even before the United Kingdom (where AM&S
had its operations) had become a Member State.
If the confidentiality of communications preceding any investigative step is to be reconciled with the construction of the
privilege as a right of the defense under the ECHR, it must necessarily be based on the right against self-incrimination, and not
the right to counsel. This may have been the rationale underlying the Court's approach in AM&S. Nonetheless, there remains
a certain inconsistency between the granting of legal privilege to
such communications in AM&S, and established case law entiling the Commission to compel an undertaking to "provide all
necessary information concerning such facts as may be known to
it" and to disclose documents in its possession "even if the latter
may be used to establish, against it or another undertaking, the
existence of anti-competitive conduct."9 9 The mere fact of being
obliged to comply with the Commission's requests for documents already in existence cannot therefore constitute a breach
of the principle of respect for the rights of defense or impair the
right to fair legal process - both principles restated in recital 23
to Regulation 1/2003.00

To the extent that it protects written

communications passed between client and lawyer well before
the start of an investigation, the rule of legal privilege as formulated in AM&S may even afford protection extending significantly beyond that strictly required by respect for the rights of
defense as construed by the ECHR, as well as the Court of Justice's own construction of the right against self-incrimination.

98. See AM&S, [1982] E.C.R. at 1576,
23, [1982] 2 C.M.L.R. 265.
99. Orkem, (1989] E.C.R. at 3284,
34, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 504.
100. See id.; Mannesmannrhren-Werke, [2001] E.C.R. 11-729 at 9 70-72, 78; Socit6
G~n~rale v. Commission, Case T-34/93, [1995] E.C.R. HI-545,
74; see also P e.a. v.
Aalborg Portland e.a., Joined Cases C-204/00,
208 (ECJ Jan. 7, 2004) (not yet reported) (holding that evidence given by an association against its members does not
amount to self-incrimination).
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II. COMPULSORY DISCLOSURE OFLAWYER-CLIENT
COMMUNICATIONS IN COMPETITION INVESTIGATIONS
CONDUCTED BY THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION:
AM&S REVISITED
A. Legal Privilege Under AM&S: The Law As It Stands
The following deals with the state of the law of legal privilege as it has developed before the Court of Justice. The law is
remarkably consistent with the requirements of the rights-of-defense rationale as put forward under section I(B) (2) above.
Virtually the entire law of legal privilege in competition proceedings before the Commission is contained in one single judgment. 1 AM&S originated in a dispute about the confidentiality of a series of documents found at the premises of AM&S during an investigation into a cartel of zinc producers. The
company claimed that the documents were privileged written
communications between lawyer and client, and refused to produce them for the Commission inspectors. The Commission
subsequently issued a decision requiring AM&S to produce the
1 2
documents. 1
In reality, the dispute in AM&S was not so much about
whether correspondence between lawyer and client could be
privileged in competition investigations - the Commission had
already accepted this principle in previous public statements'0 °
and in its submissions to the Court10 4 - but rather on the precise scope and practical implications of the privilege itself. According to the Commission, its inspectors should be entitled to
examine the contested documents themselves in order to establish "whether they should be used or not," since this was the only
way in which the inspectors would "be assured of the[ir] true
content and nature.""0 5 AM&S argued that permitting the inspectors to examine the documents would violate their confidential status, that the inspectors should be satisfied with a description of the documents, and that, in case of discrepancy, the mat101. See AM&S, [1982] E.C.R. 1575, [1982] 2 C.M.L.R_ 264; see also Hilti, [1990]
E.C.R. 11-163, [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. 602.
102. See Commission Decision No. 79/670/EEC, O.J. L 199/31 (1979).
103. See, e.g., Written Question No. 63/78 by Mr. Coust6 to the Commission, O.J. C
188/30 (1978).
104. See AM&S, [1982] E.C.R. at 1583-85 (summarizing the Commission's position
as to the existence of a principle of legal privilege in EC law).
105. AM&S, [1982] E.C.R.
11.
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ter should be referred to an independent third party."t 6 The
British government as well as the Consultative Committee of the
Bars and Law Societies of the European Community ("CCBE")
intervened on AM&S's behalf, supporting a procedure involving
recourse to an independent "expert" or "arbitration" in disputed
cases.'1

7

The French government defended the position of the

Commission.
The Court could not, however, confine its judgment to establishing procedural rules for the practical resolution of disputes concerning the privileged status of documents. It needed
first to address the heart of the matter by deciding whether a
rule of legal privilege applies in competition proceedings before
the Commission, and, if so, by defining its scope and limitations.
AM&S was not an accidental or unimportant judgment. The
Court had the benefit of "very full and very distinguished legal
submissions" from the parties and three intervenors.' 0 8 After
hearing the case and sitting in deliberation twice, the Court reopened the oral procedure'0 9 and ordered AM&S to produce
the contested documents in a sealed envelope. 110 Only the reporting judge and the Advocate-General saw the actual documents firsthand."'
The decision reached by the Court starts by reaffirming the
Commission's powers, and rejecting any suggestion that third
106. See id.
3-4. The applicant's absolute view of confidentiality would not even
have allowed inspection of the documents themselves by the third party. The Court
reports the applicant's position as implying that the third party would only "verify the
description of the contents of the documents." Id. 1 4.
107. All the parties and intervenors agreed that persistent disputes would ultimately be resolved by the Court itself, the Consultative Committee of the Bars and Law
Societies of the European Community ("CCBE") arguing that the Court's determination should proceed "on the basis of an expert's report." See AM&S, [1982] E.C.R. 1 8.
108. See I. S. Forrester, Legal Professional Privilege: Limitations on the Commission's
Powers of Inspection Following the AM&S Judgment, 20 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 75, 76
(1983). It is noteworthy that among the cohort of prominent lawyers appearing in the
case, two were later to serve as members of the Court of Justice and the Court of First
Instance.
109. This was an unusual step, intended by the Court to address the fact that its
composition had changed in the meantime. See AM&S, [1982] E.C.R. at 1603.
110. See id. at 1616 (ordering AM&S to send the whole of each of the contested
documents to the Court's registry, and explaining that "it may prove necessary for the
Court to consider for the purposes of its decision, in particular, the date on which and
the place where they were drawn up, the exact occupation or status of the author and of
the addressee and sufficient information as to the nature of their contents").
111. See Opinion of Advocate General Slynn, AM&S, [ 1982 E.C.R. at 1643; see also
KP.E. Lasok, Editorial: AM&S - The CourtDecides, 3 EUR. COMP. L. REV 99, 107 (1982).
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parties should decide on its behalf. In the course of competition
investigations, the Commission may require production of the
business documents which it considers necessary, including written communications between lawyer and client, insofar as they
1 2
have a bearing on the market activities of the undertaking.'
Moreover, it is for the Commission itself, and not the undertaking concerned or a third party (whether an expert or an arbitrator) to determine whether or not a given document must be pro113
duced.
The Court then mitigates these categorical statements (referred to as "rules" in the judgment) by recognizing that "certain
communications between lawyer and client" are protected from
scrutiny. 1 4 According to the Court, privileged communications
must be made for the purposes and in the interests of the client's rights of defense;"' and must "emanate from independent
lawyers, that is to say, lawyers who are not bound to the client by
a relationship of employment.""' 6 The Court bases the second
condition regarding the "position and status of an independent
lawyer" on a "conception of the lawyer's role as collaborating in
the administration of justice by the courts and as being required
to provide, in full independence, and in the overriding interests
of that cause, such legal assistance as the client needs." '1 7 The
legal privilege rule "must apply without distinction to any lawyer
entitled to practice his profession in one of the Member States,
regardless of the Member State in which the client lives,""' 8 and
"may not be extended beyond those limits, which are determined by the scope of the common rules on the exercise of the
legal profession."19
While there is consensus that these qualifications exclude
112. See AM&S, [1982] E.C.R.
16, 27.
113. See id. 17.
114. See id. 18 ("confidentiality serves the requirements, the importance of which
is recognized in all of the Member States, that any person must be able, without constraint, to consult a lawyer whose profession entails the giving of independent legal
advice to all those in need of it").
115. See id. 21.
116. Id.
117. Id. 24.
118. Id. 25.
119. Id. 26. The Court referred specifically to Council Directive No. 77/249/
EEC to facilitate the effective exercise by lawyers of freedom to provide services. See
Council Directive No. 77/249/EEC, OJ. L 78/17 (1977); see also Council Directive No.
98/5/EC, 0.J. L 77/36 (1998) (facilitating the practice of the profession of lawyer on a
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third-country attorneys from the benefit of legal privilege, their
significance is not necessarily limited to its "geographic" scope.
As discussed below, these statements are of great import with respect to the exclusion of legal privilege for in-house counsel.
Regarding the material scope of the privilege, it covers "all
written communications exchanged after the initiation of the administrative procedure," though it may be extended to "earlier
written communications which have a relationship to the subject
12
matter of that procedure.""
The Court further makes clear
that the lawyer's client may waive the privilege by disclosing the
written communications if he considers it to be in his best inter21
ests to do

SO.

1

The judgment in AM&S has been criticized as representing
a compromise on the "minimum" common ground that could
be found among the Member States. 122 This seems to be an unfair characterization, for AM&S clearly represents a significant
extension of existing privilege rules in most Member States.
Subsequent accessions have witnessed changes in the laws of several new Member States meant precisely to bring them up to the
standard of protection guaranteed under AM&S.
What is certain is that the Court in AM&S clearly favored
the notion of privilege as a fundamental right, establishing a set
of rules that are strikingly consistent with the rights-of-defense
rationale. Communications are automatically privileged once
the Commission "brings charges" by initiating the administrative
proceedings, though the privilege may also be extended to earpermanent basis in a Member State other than that in which the qualification was obtained).
120. See AM&S, [1982] E.C.R. 1 23. Concluding that "the principle of the protection of written communications between lawyer and client may not be frustrated on the
sole ground that the content of those communications and of that legal advice was
reported in documents internal to the undertaking," the Court of First Instance in Hilti
expanded the scope of the legal professional privilege to include internal notes "confined to reporting the text or content" of communications between lawyer and client.
See Hilti, [1990] E.C.R. 1 18.
121. See AM&S, [1982] E.C.R. 1 28.
122. See Lasok, supra note 111, at 101 (criticizing the Court's approach as "a reversal of its case law over the last twenty-eight years, a rejection of academic opinion, and a
repudiation of the views of a succession of eminent members of the Court... including
at least one President"); see also Opinion of Advocate General Slynn, AM&S, [1982]
E.C.R. at 1648-50 ("[t]here is complete agreement that when the Court interprets or
supplements EC law on a comparative law basis it is not obliged to take the minimum
which the national solution have in common, or their arithmetic mean or the solution
produced by a majority of the legal systems as the basis of its decision").
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lier written communications which have a relationship to the
subject matter of that procedure. By privileging communications passed between lawyer and client well before any investigation of AM&S had begun, AM&S may actually go beyond the
requirements of the rights of defense, as construed under the
ECHR.1 23 But given the facts of the AM&S case, it is possible
that the Court saw a link between recognition of the privilege in
these earlier documents and one component of the rights of defense, namely the right against self-incrimination. The documents recognized as privileged by the Court concerned advice
on EU competition law in view of the United Kingdom's imminent accession, advice that had been requested expressly to ascertain the prospects of litigation. Within this context, it is possible to read the seemingly obscure notion of "relationship with
the subject-matter of the procedure" as conditioning legal privilege in earlier communications on the potential for self-incrimination. Communications with a lawyer made in anticipation of
litigation would thus constitute an exception to the principle
that compelled disclosure of pre-existing documents does not
amount to self-incrimination. This is one way to explain why the
Court felt that a privilege based on the rights-of-defense rationale should be extended retroactively to a point in time prior to
an investigation by the Commission.
This reading, in turn, supports a "procedural" approach to
the notion of a "relationship with the subject-matter of the procedure." There are at least two possible readings here. A "procedural" one would require a direct link with the investigation
where access to the documents is sought by the Commission.
For a legal communication passed before the start of an investigation or the initiation of proceedings to be privileged, it would
therefore need to have been made in anticipation of such proceedings. Legal advice in this context would be a "preparatory"
step in the undertaking's defense. The second reading would
construe the expression "subject matter" literally by requiring
merely that the documents concerned contain information related to the alleged infringement. The latter reading appears
more consonant with the text of the AM&S decision, though
there is one problem: if read literally, it would render the condition imposed by the Court meaningless, since the Commission
123. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
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lacks the power to request or copy documents and records, or to
ask questions, unrelated to the subject matter of its investigation. 12 4 The Court cannot have wanted to state the obvious.
By way of conclusion, it appears that the rule that communications predating the start of the investigation may be privileged
if they present "a relationship to the subject matter of the proceedings" remains obscure. ECHR case law does not provide any
assistance in interpreting this condition, because the protection
granted in AM&S for earlier documents extends beyond the
standards required by the rights of defense before the ECHR.
This is an area which requires clarification, particularly with respect to its relationship with the rights of defense.
B. In-house Counsel
Much has been said about the discrimination against inhouse counsel in the AM&S ruling. This has been criticized as
unfair and counterproductive. It has been said that corporate
clients having their own legal departments are in a worse position than those resorting to external lawyers for legal advice.
Concern about the "chilling effect" of the lack of privilege on
candid communications with in-house lawyers is loudly voiced.
Limitation of the privilege to outside lawyers causes offense to
those who understand the rule as implying that in-house lawyers
are somehow less principled, untrustworthy, or lacking in integrity.125

To the extent that criticism against the exclusion of inhouse counsel focuses on utilitarian arguments, it is relevant. As
seen above, the utilitarian logic could apply to in-house and external lawyers alike. If the rule of legal privilege is to be deline124. See Regulation 1/2003, supra note 19, art. 20(2) (e), O.J. L 1/14, at 14 (2003)
(stating that oral questions must relate to "the subject matter and purpose of the inspection"); see also id. art. 20(3) (stating that written authorization for the inspection
must "specify the subject matter and purpose of the inspection"); id. art. 23(1) (d) (stating that, in the context of oral questioning during an inspection, fines are provided for
only in case undertakings fail or refuse to provide a complete answer on "facts relating
to the subject matter and purpose" of the inspection).
125. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 7, at 454 ("[]ustifying the narrow application of
the privilege doctrine on vague notions of professional conduct creates a sweeping and
negative generalisation about the legal ethics of in-house lawyers. In-house counsel are
just as skilled, dedicated and scrupulous as those in independent practice"). See also
Hill, supra note 7. For a detailed analysis of the position of in-house counsel under
AM&S, see Theofanis Christoforou, Protection of Legal Privilege in EEC Competition Law:
The Imperfections of a Case, 9 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1, 15-25 (1985-1986).
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ated as an instrumental device aiming at fostering candid communications with lawyers in order to enhance compliance with
the law, it may well be advisable to extend it to every person
trained in the law, without distinction. This depends only on
whether the assumptions about the social benefits of confidentiality underlying the utilitarian view are valid, and whether they
hold equally true for in-house counsel. These issues would deserve careful consideration.
However, once we move away from a utilitarian construction
of legal privilege - as the Court did in AM&S, basing the privilege on the rights of defense and a specific view of the role of the
lawyer - there are compelling arguments to differentiate between independent lawyers and in-house counsel. By and large,
the role of in-house counsel is advisory in nature, and from a
quantitative point of view, their work is much less likely to be
part of the preparation of a defense in legal proceedings. By
operation of law in many cases, as an empirical reality in others,
this role is overwhelmingly played by independent counsel.
The core question around which the debate about in-house
counsel privilege revolves is clearly the requirement of "independence." It is a simplistic view of things to read in this requirement an implicit moral judgment on the intellectual independence of the in-house lawyer. In AM&S the court appears to
have been more concerned with the "structural" independence
of the lawyer. It is worth noting that the Court did not define
the concept of independence positively (i.e. a lawyer who is a
member of the Bar is independent). Rather, it defined it negatively (the lawyer who is in a relationship of employment is not
independent). Communications with employed lawyers, independently of bar membership, are not within the scope of the
privilege. Quite clearly, the Court did not consider that bar
membership alone guaranteed the appropriate level of independence to trigger a privilege against compelled production of evidence.
An employed lawyer cannot be said to be structurally different from the undertaking employing him. It is not a "third
party" to which communications may pass. One may refer by
analogy to case law of the Court of Justice and the Court of First
Instance regarding the notion of undertaking as the entity subject to the obligations imposed by the competition rules. According to that case law, when employees and managers act
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within the scope of their employment, they do so in furtherance
of their employer's economic activity. As the Court explained in
Becu, in an employment relationship employees perform the
work in question "for and under the direction of" undertakings;
for the duration of that relationship, they are incorporated into
the undertakings concerned and thus form an economic unit
with each of them. 26 While this case law is not necessarily controlling for our purposes, it illustrates a more general trend, visi12 7
ble in other cases such as Euro-Lex European Law Expertise.
There, the Court of First Instance rejected as inadmissible an
application signed on behalf of a German company by a lawyer
who was also one of its directors. The lawyer signing the application was entitled, under German law, to represent the company
before the German courts. 128 Yet the Court of First Instance was
unimpressed. It stated firmly the principle that valid representation in proceedings before it require not only that the lawyer is
authorised to practise before a court of a Member State, but also
that the lawyer must be "a third party" who is "independent of the
applicant."1 29 In the same vein, the Court of Justice has clearly
established in Lopes that a lawyer cannot appear before the
Court representing himself, even where he would be entitled to
do so before Member State courts.' 3 ° This is an important line
of case law for the present purposes, because the AM&S Court
relied explicitly on the very provision of the Statute of the Court
which was interpreted in Euro-Lex and Lopes.' The Court's view
of the independent lawyer appears thus to imply a threshold requirement of "otherness" in relation to the client, which is ar126. Criminal proceedings against Jean-Claude Becu, Annie Verweire, Smeg NV
and Adia Interim NV, Case C-22/98, [1999] E.C.R. 1-5665, 26. See alsoJ.C.J. Wouters,
J.W. Savelbergh and Price Waterhouse Belastingadviseurs BV v. Algemene Raad van de
Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten, Case C-309/99, [2002] E.C.R. 1-1577, 49-51, [2002]
4 C.M.L.R. 27, 934-35, A49-A51.
127. See Euro-Lex European Law Expertise GmbH v. Office for Harmonisation in
the Internal Market, Case T-79/99, [1999] E.C.R. 11-3555.
128. The Court's procedural rules only state, in relevant part, that "parties must be
represented by a lawyer" and that "[o]nly a lawyer authorised to practise before a court
of a Member State... may represent or assist a party before the Court." See Protocol on
the Statute of the Court of Justice, art. 19, annexed to the TEU, the EC Treaty, and the
Euratom Treaty, OJ. C-325/167 (2002), at 171.
129. Euro-Lex, [1999] E.C.R. 11-3555, It 27, 29 (emphasis added).
130. P. Lopes v. Court of Justice, Case C-174/96, [1996] E.C.R. 1-6401,
11.
131. AM&S Europe Limited v. Commission, Case 155/79, [1982] E.C.R. 1575,
24, [1982] 2 C.M.L.R. at 324, 24.
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guably lacking in the case of employed lawyers. Indeed, in a
number of Member States, employed lawyers may not appear in
1 32
court on behalf of their employer.
A second ground in the AM&S judgment for excluding employed lawyers from the scope of the legal privilege rule appears
to lie in the part of the judgment often read as defining simply
the "geographical" requirement of qualification in one of the
Member States. This requirement seems rather to highlight the
fact that the profession of independent lawyer is regulated in all
Member States. That is, the law sets conditions as regards access
to the profession and as regards its continued exercise, and imposes, directly or indirectly, rights and duties on the members of
the profession. Persons not fulfilling those conditions cannot
exercise the functions attached to the profession, and persons
who cease to fulfil them are disciplined and may be excluded
from further exercising the profession. More importantly, there
is a common understanding of the profession of independent
lawyer, reflected in the existence of common rules. Mutual trust
in the level of regulation has allowed unhindered freedom of
establishment and provision of services across borders. This
common understanding, these common rules, and this mutual
recognition simply do not exist in the case of in-house counsel.
In most, if not all, Member States, companies are free to staff
their legal departments as they see fit, and there is no rule forcing a company to dismiss or not to employ in-house counsel having engaged in unethical behavior. Even in the countries where
there is some sort of regulation, it does usually not go further
than creating a protected "title" for company legal advisors; disciplinary powers are limited, and may depend on voluntary affiliation to the governing body of the profession. This is the case
now in Belgium, for example, where the unethical professional
may be barred from using the title of "company lawyer" ('juriste
d'entreprise"), but nothing prevents his continued employment
1 33
as in-house counsel.
132. In Germany, according to the Bundesrechtsanwaltsordnung [BRAO] [Federal Statute on Attorneys], an undertaking may not be represented in court by a
Syndikus-Anwalt, i.e., a salaried lawyer, whose function is advising the undertaking on
legal questions. See BRAO § 46, Abs. 1 (Germany). For a review of civil law jurisdictions
in this regard, see Opinion of Advocate General Slynn, AM&S, [1982] E.C.R. at 1655,
and Christoforou, supra note 125, at 18 & n.56.
133. SeeJ.-P. Buyle & I. Durant, La confidentialitides avis des juristes d'entreprise, in LE
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The third notion that appears relevant to the Court's exclusion of in-house counsel relates to incentives and disincentives.
Independence is not, in this context, a matter of moral worth.
Employed lawyers are not likely to be more dishonest or less
ethically minded than independent attorneys, or any other person for that matter. But a decision about the appropriate personal scope of legal privilege cannot stop at the functional overlap between in-house and external counsel. Because access to
part of the truth is sacrificed at the altar of legal privilege, a careful analysis of systemic incentives and disincentives is required.
And the incentives and disincentives faced by an external lawyer
and an employed one are undoubtedly different. Independent
lawyers face the prospect of disciplinary action, with the attendant loss of reputation and its consequences on business. Sanctions may include suspension or disbarment, implying the dramatic loss of the lawyer's livelihood. The independent lawyer
faces the prospect of liability for malpractice, and in some countries there is a legal obligation to obtain insurance to cover that
risk."' These very prospects keep at bay temptations to engage
in "sharp" practices - or at least they should. Independent lawyers may refuse representation, indeed any involvement with a
client, if they feel that it would be contrary to their conscience or
ethics. Indeed, they are often required to: in Belgium, the attorney's oath includes the duty to refuse to give advice or representation in any case which cannot be deemed just in conscience; 135
similarly, in Germany, the Rechtsanwalt (independent non-company lawyer) must refuse instructions contrary to the law or ethics and is obliged to decline or cease the representation if faced
with such instructions. One may legitimately suspect that these
considerations underlie the emphasis in the judgment in AM&S
on the "counterpart" to the protection offered by legal privilege,
SECRET PROFESIONNEL 187, 206 (2002) (underlining that the title is not necessary for the
exercise of the profession).
134. In France, this insurance is usually covered by a collective insurance policy
contracted by the different barreaux (bar associations) for its members. In the case of
salaried lawyers, this is either unknown or extremely rare in the legal orders of many
Member States. Concerning Spain, see F. ALvAx'Ez LOPEZ, LA RESPONSABILIDAD CIviL DE
ABOGADOS, PROCURADORES Y GRADUAoOS

SOCIALES 141-47 (2000); see also A. Bayano

Sarrate, La ResponsabilidadProfesionaldel Abogado Como Asesor de Empresas, in ETICA DE LAS
PROFESIONESJURDICAS 111 (J. L. Ferndndez Fernandez & A. Hortal Alonso eds., 2001).
135. See CodeJudiciare [Judiciary Code] art. 428 (Belg.). For text of the oath, see
id. art. 429.
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in the shape of "the rules of professional ethics and discipline
laid down and enforced in the general interest by institutions
endowed with the requisite powers for that purpose."13' 6 Although the Court was clearly of the view that bar membership
alone was not enough, it took into account the role played by
the deterrent effect of the deontological rules as a reinforcement of the lawyer's independence from the client.
By contrast, employed lawyers depend on their employer for
their livelihood, and do not usually have complete control over
their staff, who are also dependent on and accountable to the
employer. Employed lawyers are not free to choose their client
or the case, and more generally lack real freedom to refuse work
which they consider objectionable; in many companies, they are
subject to a hierarchical structure and the complex ethos of corporate personal relationships. Job security, pay raises, promotion, dismissal, and financial interests in the business results of
the company137 are real issues faced everyday in company legal
departments. Vigorous opposition to an objectionable course of
conduct favored by top executives or company directors may be
difficult. And after unsuccessful opposition, the lawyer may face
a hard choice between resignation or submission. Some authors
invoke abundant examples of litigation involving the allegedly
24.
136. See AM&S, [1982] E.C.R. 1575,
137. In the United States, long-term incentives (bonuses and stock options) as a
percentage of grand total compensation for chief legal officers employed in corporations were 44.8% in 2000 (in value U.S.$459,873). See Amy I. Stickel, The Grim Outlook:
In-House Counsel Compensation Remains Flat as Economy Slumps, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Mar.
2003 (using data from several sources). Concerning staff attorneys, nearly a quarter
(23.9%) of their salaries in 2000 consisted of such long-term incentives (U.S.$33,850).
See id. These figures saw a dramatic reduction in 2002. See id. By 2004, according to the
Atlman Weil Law Department Compensation Benchmarking Survey of U.S. corporate
law departments, the value of stock options in compensation packages of chief legal
officers had reached U.S.$618,800 (deputy chief legal officers U.S.$367,200 and division general counsel U.S.$248,300). See Press Release, In-House Lawyers See Healthy
Increases in Compensation, New Survey Reports, Altman Weil, Inc. (Oct. 20, 2004),
available at http://www.altmanweil.com/news/release.cfm?PRID=46 (last visited Aug. 1,
2005). In Canada, three-quarters of lawyers employed as general counsel receive an
annual bous; over 50% receive stock options; 61% of other in-house lawyers who are not
general counsel received a bonus averaging Can.$21,000; 22% received stock options
averaging Can.$20,000. See Kirsten McMahon, Corporate Dividends: The Canadian Lawyer 2004 In-House Counsel Compensation Survey, CANADIAN LAWYER, May 2004, available at
http://www.canadianlawyermag.com/pdfs/InHouseComp-Survey.pdf (last visited
Aug. 1, 2005). In Europe, this information is not easily available, but bonuses are generally said to represent about 10% of in-house remuneration, and stock options are
usually granted only at senior level.
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wrongful dismissal of employed lawyers who refused to assist
their employer in doubtful endeavors or refused to violate their
code of ethics. The large number of such cases is said to confirm the high ethical standards of in-house counsel and their
ability to resist pressure to violate their ethical responsibilities.138
It is, of course, also possible to take these as illustrations of the
very serious consequences that an employed lawyer may have to
face when confronted with dubious or illegitimate demands by
his employer, and of the insufficient protection offered by bar
membership and ethical duties. In their vast majority, independent lawyers do not have to contemplate the same dire consequences and are therefore in a better position to resist similar
pressures. Anecdotal - and only anecdotal, but chilling - evidence shows how far legal privilege can be diverted from its purpose in corporate settings.'
In-house legal privilege would offer rich possibilities for abuse without the need to resort to elaborate schemes. In the practical setting of a Commission
inspection, arguments could start at the basic question of
whether in-house privilege bars access to the lawyer's office
within the company.
An argument sometimes raised against the exclusion of
communications with in-house legal advisors from the benefits
of legal privilege is that it treats differently the Commission and
the undertaking. According to the case law (most notably the
order in the case of Carlsen'4 °), the opinions of the Legal Services of the European institutions are internal documents, gen138. See Hill, supra note 7, at 188-89 nn.193-95 (compiling reported cases and literature concerning suits for wrongful discharge of in-house lawyers, noting that courts in
the United States have seldom permitted such suits, and stating that "[t]he number of
these cases.., . supports the premise that in-house counsel do try to force their companies to obey the law").
139. The tobacco litigation in the United States uncovered a strategy to insulate
documents about the health hazards of smoking from discovery in potential lawsuits.
The steps included efforts to route all scientific research through the industry's lawyers,
in an attempt to bring all potentially damaging scientific documents under attorney
work product and attorney-client privilege. See generally L. Bero et al., Lauryer Control of
the Tobacco Industry's External Research Program: The Brown and Williamson Documents, 274
J. Am. MED. Ass'N 241 (1995); P. Hanauer et al., Lawyer Control of Internal Scientific Research to Protect Against Liability Lawsuits: The Brown and Williamson Documents, 274 J. AM.
MED. Ass'N 234 (1995).
140. See Carlsen v. Council, Case T-610/97, [1998] E.C.R. 11-485; see also Westdeut-

sche Landesbank v. Commission, Joined Cases T-228/99 & T-233/99, [2003] E.C.R. II435,
90-92.
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erally not to be disclosed. Several writers.. refer to this, and
denounce what they see either as inconsistency, or ominous inequality. This is the "if you can see mine, I can see yours" argument, and does not lack superficial appeal. Upon closer scrutiny, however, it may well turn out to be not only simplistic but
plainly wrong.
First, the argument ignores that an undertaking suspected
of breaching the law and the public authorities entrusted with
enforcing the law are not identical, but are in very different positions. The authority has powers of investigation without there
being parallel or equivalent powers in the hands of the undertaking as against the administration or the judiciary. It would
thus be mistaken to view the issue of access to Commission internal documents as one of "equality of arms" within the administrative competition proceedings, simply because in these proceedings the Commission acts as the law enforcement authority
and initial adjudicator, and the undertaking is targeted by an
investigation about alleged breaches of the law, founded on indiciary evidence. 4 2 Authorities and courts are vested with factfinding powers, including powers of compulsion, which are obviously not available to the undertakings under investigation. This
imbalance between the authority and the target of an investigation is inherent to the prosecution of serious wrongdoing. It is
not confined to legal communications: business secrets and similarly sensitive data are obtained during investigations, without a
corresponding right for the undertakings to pay unannounced
visits to the prosecution and inspect their premises. In plain
terms: the argument "if you see mine, I can see yours" forgets
that, in competition proceedings, documentary evidence is
sought not as a matter of caprice or routine checks, but in the
framework of an investigation into potentially serious breaches
of the law.
Second, the argument forgets that the Carlsen case was only
concerned with the issue of access to the opinion of the Legal
Services of the institutions in the specific frame of the general
right of citizens of the Union to access documents of the Com141. See, e.g.,

AUBURN,

supra note 12, at 28; Murphy, supra note 7, at 452.

142. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (noting that the treatment of hypothetical legal privilege claims in merger control proceedings, where a violation of the
law is, generally speaking, not at stake, is outside the scope of this article).
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munity institutions, first regulated in a "code of conduct" and a
series of decisions in the 1990s,14 and today by Regulation
1049/2001.44 These provisions are exclusively concerned with
"transparency" or "openness" in the work of the European institutions. For that purpose they provide for a generic right of
public access to documents. Any citizen of the Union, and any
natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in
a Member State, has a right of access to documents of the institutions, i.e. documents drawn up or received by an institution and
in its possession.1 45 There are exceptions to this principle of
general access, including inter alia opinions for internal use as
part of deliberations and preliminary consultations within the institution. Third-party documents are even less widely disclosed:
in particular, access to a document is not granted if disclosure
would undermine the protection of privacy or the commercial
interests of a natural or legal person.1 4 6 Before disclosing thirdparty documents, the institution must consult the third party
with a view to assessing whether an exception is applicable, unless it is clear that the document must or must not be disclosed. 147 It is quite obvious that these exceptions cover not only
internal Commission documents, but equally - and probably to
a greater extent - all evidence gathered by the Commission in
the course of competition investigations. Clearly, a request of
access by any citizen of the Union to an opinion of the Commission's Legal Service would be denied in the very same manner as
a request for access to the legal advice given by a lawyer 143. See generally Code of Conduct Concerning Public Access to Council and Commission Documents, No. 93/730/EC, O.J. L 340/41 (1993); Commission Decision No.
94/90/EC, O.J. L 46/58 (1994), amended by Decision No. 96/567/EC, O.J. L 247/45
(1996) (regarding public access to Commission documents); Council Decision No. 93/
731/EC, O.J. L 340/43 (1993) (regarding public access to Council documents); European Parliament Decision No. 97/532/EC, O.J. L 263/27 (1997) (on public access to
European Parliament documents).
144. See Council and European Parliament Regulation No. 1049/2001, O.J. L 145/
43 (2001) (regarding public access to European Parliament, Council, and Commission
documents); see also Council Decision No. 2001/840/EC, O.J. L 313/40 (2001)
(amending the Council's Rules of Procedure).
145. See Council and European Parliament Regulation No. 1049/2001, art. 2, O.J.
L 145/43 at 1, 3 (2001). The institutions may also grant access to documents to any
natural or legal person not residing or not having its registered office in a Member
State. See id. art. 2.
146. See id. art. 4.
147. See id. art. 4(4).

2005]

PRIVILEGE IN COMPETITION PROCEEDINGS

1019

whether in-house or external - to an undertaking under investigation in a competition case.
The only acceptable parallel that could be drawn between
the position of an undertaking subject to an investigation into
possible infringements of the competition rules and the position
of the Commission is where the latter appears as defendant in an
appeal against one of its decisions, and there is suspicion that
the Commission has misused its powers. Then, the position of
the Commission is arguably similar to that of the undertaking
suspected of serious wrongdoing. And there, not only is the
Carlsen case law not controlling, but a number of judgments
make clear that, even though in the course of the administrative
procedure the Commission does not have to disclose internal
documents,1 4 8 the Court is prepared to order disclosure of internal Commission documents in the context of judicial proceedings about the legality of the Commission's acts, if the aim is to
prove through an inspection of internal documents that the
Commission has abused its discretionary powers.1 4 9 It should
not be surprising that such disclosure would only be ordered at
the request of a party,1 5 ° where the circumstances give rise to
serious doubts as to the real reasons underlying the decision
and, in particular, to "suspicions that those reasons were extraneous to the objectives of Community law and hence amounted
to a misuse of powers"1 5 or other serious irregularities. How148. See, e.g.,
BPB Industries and British Gypsum v. Commission, Case T-65/89,
[1993] E.C.R. 11-389,
33; Krupp Thyssen Stainless & Acciai Speciali Terni v. Commission, Joined Cases T-45/98 & T-47/98, [2001] E.C.R. 11-3757,
46-47; Cimenteries
CBR v. Commission, Joined Cases T-25/95 & Others, [2000] E.C.R. 11-491,
196, 420;
LR AF 1998 A/S (formerly Logstor Ror A/S) v. Commission, Case T-23/99, [2002]
E.C.R. II-1705, 170. The case law justifies restrictions on access to internal documents
by the need to ensure the proper functioning of the institution concerned when dealing with infringements of the Treaty competition rules.
149. See Opinion of Advocate General Alber, Falck SpA and Acciaierie di Bolzano
SpA v. Commission, Joined cases C-74/00 P & C-75/00 P, [2002] E.C.R. 1-7869,
72;
Ghignone v. Council, Case T-44/97, [2000] E.C.R. 11-1023, 11 47-48; BAT v. Commission, Joined Cases 142/84 & 156/84, [1986] E.C.R. 1899, 11; Austria v. Council, Case
C-445/00 (ECJ, Oct. 23, 2002) (not yet reported),
12.
150. Under Article 24 of the Statute of the Court of Justice, the Court may require
the parties to produce all documents and to supply all information which it considers
desirable. Under Article 64(3) (d) and (4) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of
First Instance, measures of organization of procedure may consist of asking for documents or any papers relating to the case to be produced and their adoption may be
proposed by the parties at any stage of the procedure.
151. BAT, [1986] E.C.R. 1899,
11.
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ever, the important point is that the confidentiality of internal
Commission documents is not absolute and may be lifted in exceptional circumstances if the applicants make out a plausible
15 2
case for the need to do so.
C. ProceduralHandlingof Legal Privilege: The ProofDilemma15 3
Privileges against compelled production of evidence present
an apparently insoluble dilemma to the adjudicator. The dilemma is that often the only way to establish whether the privilege applies is to look into the content of the documents themselves. Thus, the adjudicator will either have to examine the allegedly privileged communication directly - at the risk of
trumping the very rule whose applicability is at dispute - or tolerate a potentially huge margin of uncertainty in resolving disputed claims of privilege. As the AM&S case itself clearly shows,
privilege claims cannot be adjudicated on the exclusive basis of
declarations of the party claiming privilege. At some point,
somebody has to examine the documents. This dilemma does
not emerge, to the same extent at least, when the privilege is
claimed against compelled testimony.15 4 For this reason, only
the situation where the privilege is raised to bar production of
existing documentary evidence needs to be considered here.
I submit that, unlike other potentially confidential communications, lawyer-client communications present a much less serious version of the proof dilemma. This conclusion derives also
from the previous discussion concerning the rationale of legal
privilege: some exceptions to compelled testimony and other ev152. See, e.g., HFB Holding v. Commission, Case T-9/99, [2002] E.C.R. 11-1487, 1
40; BAT, [1986] E.C.R. 1899, 11; Deere v. Commission, Case T-35/92, [1994] E.C.R.
11-957, 31; NMH Stahlwerke v. Commission,Joined Cases T-134/94 & Others, [1997]
E.C.R. 11-2293
35. Obviously, the Commission submits to Court orders to disclose
internal documents. See, e.g., BASF and Others v. Commission, Joined Cases T-79/89 &
Others, [1992] E.C.R. 11-315, 1 17-18, 25; ASPEC and Others v. Commission, Case T435/93, [1995] E.C.R. 11-1281, 1299; Mc Avoy v. Parliament, Case T-45/91, [1993]
E.C.R. 11-83, 11 15-16; Association des Amidonneries de Cr6ales de la CEE and Others
v. Commission, Case T-442/93, [1995] E.C.R. IU-1329, It 65, 80.
153. See The Future Crime or Tort Exception to CommunicationsPriviliges,supra note 34,
at 736.
154. As long as the witness has not spoken, the allegedly privileged material does
not exist. Once the statement has been produced, the issue becomes one of admissibility of the information disclosed. Since the information has already been disclosed, the
issue of admissibility can be adjudicated on the basis of an examination of the information itself.
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identiary privileges are probably motivated by the protection of
the privacy interests of the communicating parties. Let us take
marital privilege (or, in many civil-law countries, the parallel
doctrine of incompetence of close relatives to testify) as the paradigmatic example, and suppose that in a given jurisdiction it
protects intimate correspondence between husband and wife.
The proof dilemma is exceptionally acute here, because the expectation of confidentiality is anchored chiefly in privacy concerns. And privacy will suffer irremediably even if disclosure is
made only for the purposes of adjudicating the claim of privilege. The case is strong here for disposing of privilege claims in
a manner that does not involve disclosure of the contested material. This forces the law to create very strong presumptions of
privilege, emanating simply from the existence of the privileged
relationship.
The situation is different concerning legal privilege. If we
view legal privilege as chiefly concerned with the rights of defense, and accept that the privacy rationale is not its central concern, the client's interest is confined to the possible use in legal
proceedings of communications with his lawyer liable to result in
a decision unfavorable to his interests. The only reason why the
privilege is not confined to an evidentiary rule of inadmissibility
is that the viewing of the evidence by the authority orjurisdiction
competent to decide the substance of the proceedings may taint
its vision of the case, and - in the case of an investigating authority or magistrate - may consciously or unconsciously give a
different direction to the investigation. If disclosure for the purposes of adjudicating the privilege claim can be done in such a
manner that guarantees the absence of harm to this paramount
interest, there will be no harm to the right of defense, and thus
the client's (legitimate) interest in non-disclosure will be preserved.
This reasoning, which stems inevitably from the view of legal
privilege as a corollary of the rights of defense, finds support in
the order of September 27, 2004, of the President of the Court
of Justice, ruling on the appeal in the Akzo Nobel interim measures case. 5 5 The President of the Court of Justice overturned
the order of the President of the Court of First Instance partially
155. Commission v. Akzo Nobel Chemicals, Case C-7/04 P(R), (ECJ Sep. 27, 2004)
(not yet reported). This order annuls the order of the President in of the Court of First
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granting interim measures, on the grounds that the condition
relative to urgency was not satisfied, and therefore interim measures were not warranted.
The President of the Court of First Instance had considered
that it had not yet been established that, in the context of an
inspection, the Commission's officials must refrain from "casting
even a cursory glance over the documents" which an undertaking claims to be protected by professional privilege. Although
the Commission inspectors did actually "cast a cursory glance"
over some of the documents (and copied in full another set of
documents), the President of the CFI granted interim measures
to prevent the Commission from looking further into the documents until the Court had issued its final ruling.
The President of the Court of Justice disagreed, and ruled
that one of the conditions for granting interim measures ("urgency", i.e. the likelihood of serious and irreparable harm) was
not satisfied. He stated in this regard:
The Court has .

.

. held, with respect to a decision by the

Commission to order an investigation, that if that decision
were annulled by the Communityjudicature, the Commission
would in that event be prevented from using, for the purposes of proceeding in respect of an infringement of the
Community competition rules, any documents or evidence
which it might have obtained in the course of that investigation, as otherwise the decision on the infringement might, in
so far as it was based on such evidence, be annulled by the
Community judicature ....
The same principles apply where a decision of the Commission not to allow professional privilege for one or more
documents is at issue and that decision is annulled by the
Community judicature.
The Commission accepts, moreover, that if the decision
of 8 May 2003 were subsequently held to be unlawful, it would
be required to remove from its file the documents affected by
that unlawfulness and would therefore be unable to use them
as evidence.
In those circumstances, the possibility of the unlawful
use of the ... documents in proceedings for infringement of
Instance in Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd. and Akcros Chemicals Ltd. v. Commission,
Joined Cases T-125/03 R & T-253/03 R, [2004] E.C.R. -, [2004] 4 C.M.L.R. 15.
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the Community competition rules brought by the Commission is purely theoretical, and in any event improbable.
In view of the Commission's undertaking not to allow
third parties to have access to the .

.

. documents until judg-

ment is given on the main application in Case T-253/03 and
of the impossibility of the Commission using those documents as evidence in proceedings for infringement of the
Community competition rules if the decision of 8 May 2003
were held to be unlawful, only the disclosure of the docuthe condition
ments in question could serve to establish 1that
56
of urgency is satisfied in the present case.
Recalling that the Commission's officials had already examined, "albeit cursorily," the documents in question during the
inspection, the President of the Court ruled that "[t]he harm
which might possibly result from a more detailed reading of
those documents is not sufficient to establish the existence of
is preserious and irreparable harm, since the Commission
157
obtained.
thus
information
the
using
from
vented
By focusing its analysis of possible harm arising from disclosure of the allegedly privileged documents exclusively on the
possible impact on the proceedings before the Commission, the
Order follows a reasoning that is entirely in harmony with a view
of legal privilege as a corollary of the rights of defense.
To be sure, and despite what a cursory reading might suggest, I submit that the President of the Court of Justice did not
transform legal privilege exclusively into a rule about the admissibility of evidence. He appeared to accept that disclosure of
privileged information could be harmful in itself, even if the
Commission does not disclose it further to third parties and does
not use it in evidence in the proceedings. The Order states that
"mere reading by the Commission of the information in the ...
documents, without that information being used in proceedings
for the infringement of the Community competition rules, may
Howpossibly be capable of affecting professional privilege." '
ever this statement does not indicate acceptance of other rationales for the privilege apart from the preservation of the rights
of defense of the client in the competition proceedings before
156. Commission v. Akzo Nobel Chemicals, Case Case C-7/04 P(R),
Sep. 27, 2004) (not yet reported) (citations omitted).
157. Id.
4243.
158. Id. 1 41.

37-42, (ECJ
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the Commission. It stands simply for the proposition that legal
privilege may be more than a rule about the admissibility of evidence. However, it is true that the Order just summarized appears to take away some of the sanctity of legal privilege. Again,
I suggest, this is entirely consistent with a view of legal privilege
as an emanation of the rights of defense.
The developments above, and the Order of the President of
the Court of Justice in Akzo, strongly suggest that proper adjudication of legal privilege claims in competition proceedings does
not require a battery of presumptions, but should proceed on
the basis of limited disclosure of the allegedly privileged material
to a person, organ, or magistrate not involved in investigating,
prosecuting, or deciding the legal proceedings where the relevant documents could be used as evidence, and subject to the
strictest duty of confidentiality. This person or organ should be
able to directly examine the documents for which confidentiality
is claimed. From a utilitarian perspective, limited disclosure of
this type dramatically increases the probability that claims of
privilege will be correctly adjudicated, and thus will foster the
flow of the type of information that the privilege is intended to
protect. While in the adjudication of private conflicts there
seems to be no reason why this role could not be played by any
independent third party agreed by the parties, matters of public
law require disclosure to be made to, and applicability of the
privilege decided by, a public authority.
This direction is clearly illustrated by the approach of the
Court in AM&S, where the contested documents were sent to
the registry in a sealed envelope, and were seen only by the reporting judge and the Advocate-General. There is no discernible way in which this procedure could have harmed the rights of
defense, (or indeed any other legitimate interests) of the undertaking. This is even so in a case which presented a critical setting
for the "proof dilemma," because the privilege claim was being
decided by the full Court, with all the judges deliberating.
Therefore the integrity of the rights of defense required disclosure to be as limited as possible, because there was a clear possibility that the case on the substance would subsequently be
brought before the Court for determination by all or some of
the same judges. Under normal circumstances, the privilege
claim could be decided by a chamber of the Court, and any subsequent conflict about the substance of the case could be allo-
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cated to a different chamber. 159 In any event, a judge involved
with the adjudication of the privilege claim could always recuse
him- or herself from subsequent participation in the case.
The proper way to dispose of privilege claims before the
Court seems therefore relatively unproblematic. What about the
earlier stages? Unless the prospect of litigating away every disputed privilege claim appears satisfactory, some improvement
would be desirable in the Commission's procedures to address
the proof dilemma in disputed privilege cases. Recourse to third
parties does not seem advisable in procedures involving the application of public law. Moreover, any procedure involving arbitration or the intervention of external experts would encounter
the obstacle that this was quite clearly excluded by the Court of
Justice in AM&S, where it stated that it is for the Commission
itself, "and not the undertaking concerned or a third party,
whether an expert or an arbitrator, to decide whether or not a
document must be produced to it. '
This "rule" formulated by the Court may be interpreted as
having some meaning beyond permitting the Commission to
adopt a "blind" decision requesting production which could
then be challenged by the Court. At the level of the Commission
itself, a procedure might be devised whereby the proof dilemma
could be resolved by disclosure of the contested documents to
an organ not involved in the investigation and adjudication of
the substance of the competition case. Although the inspectors
are not the decision-makers, and very often are competition officials not involved with the case, enlisted solely for the purposes
of the inspection, they are not well- placed to adjudicate borderline privilege claims. Inspectors usually operate under the direction of officials in charge of the investigation, and their duties
during the inspection place them clearly in an adversarial position in relation to the undertaking. On the other hand, it seems
extreme to believe that mere assertion of privilege should in all
cases suffice to prevent the inspectors from viewing a document.
It cannot be ruled out that, faced with an improper claim of privilege, the inspectors would be justified in reviewing a document
and copying it. However, in cases of genuine dispute, inspectors
159. See Lasok, supra note 111, at 108.
160. AM&S Europe Limited v. Commission, Case 155/79, [1982] E.C.R. 1575,
17. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
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should, as they do, refrain from reading the contents of the document, and arrange for a secure procedure for integral copies to
be made of allegedly privileged material, and such copies to be
secured and protected against any tampering. A "sealed envelope" taken away from the premises and deposited in a safe place
appears to be a satisfactory procedure which protects the interests of all involved. That the "safe place" should be under the
Commission's control and not that of the company or a third
party seems inevitable and largely incontrovertible.
The next step is where there seems to be scope for improvement. The European Court of Human Rights has accepted that
review of communications with a lawyer could be accepted
under adequate safeguards. In Erdem v. Germany, it held that because the review of correspondence was effected by an independent magistrate not linked with the investigation and under an
obligation of secrecy regarding the information acquired
through such review, sufficient safeguards had been taken. 6 1
An independent organ entrusted with ensuring respect of the
rights of defense throughout the proceedings exists within the
Commission: the Hearing Officers. 1 62 Subject to review by the
Court, a safe procedure with adequate guarantees could be devised whereby the contents of the documents in dispute would
be briefly made accessible to one of the Hearing Officers, perhaps in the presence of the undertaking and the official managing the case, so that he or she would be able to make a determination on behalf of the Commission with the aid of precise in
pectore knowledge of the nature and contents of the document.
The documents would then be put back in a sealed envelope.
The Hearing Officer in question would either take the decision
him- or herself (this would require providing for delegation of
161. See Erdem v. Germany, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 15,
67 (2002).
162. Hearing Officers are "independent persons experienced in competition matters" with the "integrity necessary to contribute to the objectivity, transparency and efficiency" of competition proceedings. Their terms of reference are framed so that they
are exclusively concerned with the fights of defense of the undertakings throughout
the whole procedure. Their functions include, inter alia, presiding over and conducting hearings, and deciding on claims of confidentiality regarding information to
transmit to third parties, and publication of decisions. In order to ensure their independence, the Hearing Officers are attached (for administrative purposes only) directly
to the member of the Commission with special responsibility for competition. See Commission Decision No. 2001/462/EC, ECSC, OJ. L 162/21 (2001) (determining the
terms of reference of hearing officers in certain competition proceedings).
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powers by the Commission to the Hearing Officers, as is the case
today for a number of other decisions) or simply report to the
Commission and propose either a decision requiring production
of the document, or a decision that the documents should not
be used and should be returned to the undertaking. The decision to request production of the document under either Articles 18, 20 or 21 of Regulation 1/2003 would of course be subject to appeal before the Court of First Instance, and interim
measures would be available in the same manner as today. But
the advantage would be that Commission's decisions on privilege claims would be taken soundly, rather than blindly. If necessary, the Hearing Officer who read the allegedly privileged
documents could be restricted from being otherwise involved
with the case.
This proposal would probably require some adjustments to
the Mandate of the Hearing Officers, perhaps even reconsideration of their hierarchical position: placing them under the direct authority of the President of the Commission would remove
them further from the investigative and decision-making process. However, the main guarantees of independence from the
prosecution, concern with respect of the rights of defense, and
no participation in the investigation and adjudication of the substance of the case, are already in place.1 6
By way of conclusion, I submit that the proof dilemma does
not present genuine difficulties in the approach to legal privilege in competition proceedings before the Commission.
AM&S has shown a procedural path that is both workable and
respectful of all interests at stake. Its only inconvenience is that
effective adjudication of privilege claims requires either negotiation and mutual concessions - with the concomitant potential
for incorrect adjudication - or systematic litigation, a costly and
time-consuming solution, fraught with risks of abuse. 6 4 Review
of disputed documents by one of the Hearing Officers, subject to
163. A not very different procedure had been suggested in AM&S itself by Advocate General Warner. See AM&S, [1982] E.C.R. at 1640 (exploring, but not retaining,
the possibility that the contested documents could be "sent in a sealed envelope for
perusal by, say, someone in the Commission's Legal Service, who would be required to
impart its contents only to the Members of the Commission responsible for taking the
actual decision on the claim.., who would be required ...to take no further personal
part in the case").
164. Contra Christofourou, supra note 125, at 48 (approving the AM&S procedure
as "reasonable," and stating as the only difficulty that it "could make the Court ofJustice
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appropriate guarantees and necessary adaptations of and
changes to the Hearing Officers' mandate, would improve the
process without significant detriment to the rights of defense of
the client which the privilege seeks to protect.
D. Legal Developments
1. Powers of the Commission in Competition Investigations
A brief reminder of the Commission's investigative toolbox
appears useful, in order to ascertain whether Regulation 1/2003
creates new situations where claims of "legal privilege" against
compelled production of evidence on the basis of the AM&S
case law will arise. Chapter V of Regulation 1/2003 (Articles 1722) sets out the investigative tools available in competition proceedings conducted by the Commission. Stated briefly,' 6 5 these
include:
* the power of the Commission to require undertakings to
provide information;
* the power to conduct inspections at the premises of any
undertaking or association of undertakings (and, in case of
suspected serious infringements, at other premises including private dwellings of the undertaking's directors, managers and staff);
" the power to take and record statements from any natural
or legal person who agrees to be interviewed.
These are largely the same powers already enjoyed by the
Commission under Regulation No. 17.66 The only substantial
differences concern the express statutory recognition of the
power to take voluntary statements, the new power to inspect
non-business premises, the possibility to affix seals on premises,
books or records during an inspection, and the new wording of
into a court of first instance," something "definitely not intended by the Treaties").
Note that a Court of First Instance exists today, which was not the case in 1982.
165. For the sake of brevity, the "sector inquiries" or investigations into "types of
agreements" provided for in Article 17 of Regulation 1/2003 are not listed here. These
allow the Commission, where market conditions suggest that competition is restricted,
to undertake investigations in a given industry or about similar agreements across industries. This Article does not provide for any additional evidence-gathering tools, but
allows the Commission in such circumstances to use its standard investigative powers
(with the notable exception of inspections at non-business premises).
166. Council Regulation No. 17/62, 13 O.J. 204 (1962) (First Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty, as subsequently amended) [hereinafter Regulation 171.
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Article 20(2) (e), which suggests an expansion of the old power
to request "oral explanations on the spot" during an inspection.
These will be briefly commented on in turn, with a view to determine whether the changes are likely to have any bearing on the
question of legal privilege.
Under Article 19(1) of Regulation 1/2003, the Commission
can take only voluntary statements. While this is, technically, a
new provision, it may well not amount to a new power in substance. Nothing before Regulation 1/2003 prevented any individual or undertaking from producing written or oral statements
before the Commission, and nothing prevented these statements
from being used in the proceedings. There is no compelled production of evidence, and there is not even a legally enforceable7
16
duty to produce a complete, truthful, and accurate statement.
There seems to be little in this "new" investigative power that
could be characterized as expanding the categories of evidence
available to the Commission in a manner that could give rise to a
claim of legal privilege. One could imagine the case of a lawyer
voluntarily appearing before the Commission to disclose legal
advice given to the undertaking under investigation. The absence of any element of compulsion would however place this
hypothetical in a slightly different situation not addressed in
AM&S. The issues raised by a purely voluntary statement concern at most the admissibility of the statement as evidence in the
proceedings (or its probative value against the undertaking), and
the consequences of the breach of confidentiality obligations by the
lawyer. The first issue differs from the subject of the discussion
here, and would be addressed at the stage of an appeal against
the Commission's final decision on the merits of the case, perhaps under the same substantive rules defining the scope of the
privilege, but not necessarily. 6 ' The second issue concerns only
the relationship between the lawyer and the client; it is not governed by Community law, but by national laws, and would be
167. It is noteworthy that Regulation 1/2003 does not provide for any sanctions if
voluntary statements made under Article 19 prove later to have been incomplete, misleading, or even false. See Regulation 1/2003, art. 23(1).
168. An important point is that many of the practical difficulties involved in designing a rule against compelled disclosure are absent in application of the "admissibility" prong of the rule as against voluntary statements in breach of such a rule. The
precise nature and contents of the communication are available at the time the Commission or the Court would need to address the issue of admissibility, and any harm to
the client does not originate in use of compulsory powers.
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decided in proceedings before national courts. It is not an issue
specific to the lawyer; a voluntary statement by a doctor, an employee, or an accountant could likewise give rise to civil or criminal liability for breach of contract, or for breach of professional
obligations imposed by law in some Member States.
Article 20(2) (e) of Regulation 1/2003 also deserves some
attention. It allows the Commission inspectors "to ask any representative or member of staff of the undertaking or association of
undertakings for explanations on facts or documents relating to
the subject matter and purpose of the inspection and to record
the answers." This contrasts with the laconic provision in Regulation 17 empowering the Commission inspectors "to ask for oral
explanations on the spot,"1'69 which the case law had interpreted
as limiting the inspectors' power to seeking explanations about
the books and records under examination. 171 While the new
provision appears to expand the scope of permissible questioning, it remains to be seen how it will be interpreted by the Community courts. While this is unforeseeable at the time of writing,
some observations may nevertheless be made.
To determine whether Article 20(2) (e) can be considered
"compulsory" requires that a distinction be made between the
undertaking and the individuals subject to questioning. The latter would not seem to be under direct compulsion to speak. In
case of failure or refusal to provide a complete answer, Article
23 (1) (d) of Regulation 1/2003 contemplates fines on the undertaking, but penalties on the individuals subject to questioning
are not provided for. National sanctions might be envisaged, although Article 12(3) of Regulation 1/2003 contains considerable limits on the possibility that the information exchanged between authorities could be used by a national authority to impose sanctions on natural persons, and excludes custodial
sanctions. It could perhaps be argued that the refusal to answer
in itself constitutes "information" exchanged between the Commission and a national authority. The question remains to what
extent national sanctions (under domestic provisions concerning obstruction of investigations, for example) could be imposed
on individuals refusing to answer questions, bearing in mind
169. Regulation No. 17, art. 14(1)(c).
170. See National Panasonic v.Commission, Case 136/79, [1980] E.C.R. 2056,
15; see also Elf Atochem v. Commission, Case T-9/97, [1997] E.C.R. 11-919, 1 23.
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that, if the individuals risk being prosecuted themselves, they
may well have a right against self-incrimination and to remain
silent. The question may turn out to be theoretical: the prospect of sanctions for obstruction appear much more applicable
to the "old" powers to inspect books and documents (where an
employee would attempt to block the door, for example, or refuse to indicate the location of certain files), than in the context
of questioning (where one would expect employees simply not
to remember facts and information, rather than refuse categorically to speak).
Article 20(2) (e) allows the inspectors to question "any representative or member of staff." It is not clear what a "representative" is in this context, but the difference seems to matter.
Regulation 773/2004 ("the implementing Regulation") 17 1 provides that
In cases where a member of staff of an undertaking or of an
association of undertakings who is not or was not authorised
by the undertaking or by the association of undertakings to
provide explanations on behalf of the undertaking or association of undertakings has been asked for explanations, the
Commission shall set a time-limit within which the undertaking or the association of undertakings may communicate to
the Commission any rectification, amendment or supplement
to the explanations given by such member of staff. The rectification, amendment or supplement shall be added to the explanations as recorded...
It appears thus that only explanations given by "members of
staff" may be rectified, amended, or supplemented. 7 2 On its
face, this provision excludes rectification or amendment for explanations provided by a "representative." Comparing this provision with Article 23(1)(d) of Regulation 1/2003 (which provides
that fines may be imposed on undertakings where they fail to
rectify within the time limit fixed by the Commission an incorrect, incomplete, or misleading answer given by a member of
their staff to questions in the course of inspections), it appears
171. Commission Regulation No. 773/2004, O.J. L 123/18 (2004) [hereinafter
Regulation No. 773] (relating to the conduct of proceedings by the Commission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty).
172. One of the recitals to the regulation clarifies that "[t]he explanations given by
a member of staff should remain in the Commission file as recorded during the inspection". Regulation No. 773, Recital 4, supra note 171, O.J. L 123/18 (2004).
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that explanations by a staff member are always subject to rectification or amendment. Consequently, any person authorized to
speak on behalf of the undertaking must be deemed a "representative".
Where does this leave us regarding legal privilege claims
arising in the context of questioning? It may be argued that the
answers to the inspector's questions do not constitute lawyer-client communications, but an alternative source of evidence for
facts and information. As long as the questioning concerns facts,
no privilege claim should arise, since it is generally accepted that
the privilege covers lawyer-client communications, but not the
underlying facts contained in such communications. Therefore,
questions about the contents of a contract which cannot be
found, or about commercial actions and strategies of the undertaking, should not give rise to a claim of legal privilege, even if a
lawyer was consulted about the contracts or about the legal implications of such commercial strategies. The issue may be more
complex than that, however: if the inspectors request "explanations" concerning specifically legal communications, and in particular questions about the legal advice received (e.g., "what did
the lawyer say?"), a legal privilege claim may well arise if the legal
advice at issue is related to the subject-matter of the proceedings. 1 1 3 However, generally speaking, the arguably wider scope
of inspectors' questions may present legal privilege issues in a
new setting, but since the answers do not themselves constitute
legal communications, it seems that this will seldom arise.
The power to affix seals on premises or documents stands
out as the first and only - if modest - coercive power ever
vested directly in the Commission's inspectors. As it has no discernible effect on the types of evidence accessible to the Commission, it does not seem fated to influence the discussion on
legal privilege. At most, one might think that seals could be
used as a tool in some improved procedure to secure the integrity of documents whose privileged status is contested. However,
there is probably little mileage to this idea, since the affixing of
173. See Christoforou, supra note 125, at 42 (expressing the view that employees
would be justified in refusing to answer questions when doing so would disclose information covered by the privilege). About the meaning of "relationship with the subject
matter of the proceedings in the AM&S judgment, see supra notes 120-121 and accompanying text.
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seals is expressly limited to the duration of the inspections.1 74 In
any event, an analogous procedure is currently followed by the
Commission where the privileged status of a document is in dispute ("sealed envelope" procedure).
Inspections in places other than at the undertaking's own
premises ("non-business premises") are the real novelty in the
Commission's toolbox. However, this does not seem either to
raise any new questions regarding legal privilege against compelled production of evidence, because the categories of evidence accessible to the inspectors remain the same as in an ordinary inspection (business records or professional documents).
Article 21(4) limits the inspectors' powers further: no provision
is made for oral explanations and the affixing of seals during
inspections in non-business premises; such inspections require
judicial authorization, and are only allowed in cases of suspected
17
serious infringements. Spectacular as this power may appear, 1
it entails an additional intrusion only with regard to the privacy
of the individuals affected by an inspection at their home. However, it is the fact of the inspection in non-business premises that
constitutes the additional intrusion; for this reason, judicial authorization is necessary, and it is imaginable that stricter standards of judicial review would apply against arbitrary or disproportionate inspections at private homes. But once the inspection is deemed valid, the categories of material accessible to the
inspectors are strictly the same as in regular inspections at business premises. The regulation places no additional burden on
the privacy rights of the individuals involved from the point of
view of the types of evidence targeted by the inspection. Nonbusiness records, such as personal correspondence, are not
targeted. There is also no discernible additional risk that a
174. See Regulation 1/2003, art. 20(2) (d) (seals may be affixed "for the period and
to the extent necessary for the inspection"). Recital 25 of the Regulation places an
indicative limit of seventy-two hours. See id. Recital 25.
175. This power may not be as radically novel as often thought. See Commission
Decision No. 379/84/ECSC, 0.J. L 46/23 (1984) (defining the powers of officials and
agents of the Commission instructed to carry out the checks provided for in the ECSC
Treaty and decisions taken in application thereof); see also id. art. 1(1) (a) (providing for
the inspection of books and records "wherever such books or business records are
kept"); id. art. 1 (1) (d) (allowing expressly the inspection of third party premises, providing for the power "to enter any premises, land or means of transport of undertakings, and of any third party with whom books or business records have been deposited."
Id.
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threat to the rights of defense of the undertaking may be involved in inspections at non-business premises. The new power
to inspect "other premises," including private dwellings, does
not therefore appear to provide a basis for an extension of legal
privilege to new categories of evidence.
Thus, a crucial feature of Commission investigations, which
remains unchanged in Regulation 1/2003, is that an element of
compulsion to produce evidence exists only in relation to documentary evidence consisting of business records and professional
documents of the undertaking. Even then, the Commission's
powers are limited. It may simply "request" such documentary
evidence, and in case of refusal, issue a decision that the documents be produced under threat of financial penalties. The
Commission may also inspect premises, request to see documents and records related to the subject matter of its investigation, and take copies. It is quite clear that the powers of the
Commission in the context of such inspections are not true powers of "search and seizure". Contrary to received wisdom, the
Commission's investigative tools are, therefore, relatively limited.
Certainly Commission cartel investigators view with envy their
counterparts in other places of the world who are able to tap
phones or place people or companies under surveillance.
The situation is not very different in investigations of
breaches of EC competition law conducted by nationalcompetition
authorities.'7 6 Without entering into details, it is fair to say that,

in most cases, their powers are limited in a manner similar to
those of the Commission, if not more so.' 7 7

Only criminal prose-

176. Historically, the antitrust enforcement process in the EU has been agencycentered and relatively centralized. Civil litigation before national courts and enforcement by national agencies has so far remained marginal compared to the part played by
the Commission. Regulation 1/2003 purports to change this state of affairs, setting the
ground for a vast de-centralization of the enforcement of EU antitrust law.
177. Pursuant to Article 20(5) of Regulation 1/2003, when national competition
authorities assist during an inspection conducted by the Commission, their agents have
the same powers as the Commission's own officials under Article 20(2). See Regulation
1/2003, art. 20(5). When, at the Commission's request, an inspection is entrusted to,
and carried out by, the national competition authority itself, the latter's officials "exercise their powers in accordance with their national law." A natural reading of this provision suggests not only that the powers of national authorities in this situation are exclusively governed by domestic law, and are neither limited to those recognised under
Article 20(2), nor necessarily coextensive with them, but also that limitations placed by
domestic law on the evidence to be collected (such as broader legal privilege rules)
remain applicable.
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cutors or investigating magistrates - in the very few Member
States where violation of EC competition law constitutes a criminal offence - may have more substantial investigative powers.
An examination of the treatment of legal privilege claims in the
context of national investigations falls outside the scope of this
article. The possible impact of the case law of the Court of Justice on these procedures will be briefly addressed in the next
section.
By way of conclusion, it may be said that Regulation 1/2003
has not radically changed the setting where claims of professional privilege against compelled production of evidence could
arise in competition investigations conducted by the Commission, nor substantially increased the likelihood of intruding into
the lawyer-client relationship. By and large, legal privilege
claims will remain concerned with decisions of the Commission
requesting production of documentary evidence (business books
or records and professional documents), and with the copying of
the same material during inspections. Claims of "legal privilege"
against the admissibility of evidence might also arise in relation
to the contents of voluntary statements recorded by the Commission, although the absence of compulsion makes this highly theoretical. Article 20(2) (e) of the Regulation might give rise to
privilege issues if the Commission takes an expansive view of the
scope of permissible questioning.
2. Evolution of the Body of Common Principles and Concepts
Setting aside the question whether Regulation 1/2003 has
brought with it an increase in the powers of the Commission
which expand the likelihood of invasion into lawyer-client relationships, another issue deserves examination in examining
whether the AM&S case law merits reconsideration. Have the
laws of the Member States evolved in a manner which would now
justify an extension of the categories of material beyond the
reach of the Commission? Indeed, this seems to have been, at
least in part, the premise of the Akzo interim measures order,
where the President of the Court of First Instance held that the
evidence on record "appears primafacie to be capable of showing
that the role assigned to independent lawyers of collaborating in
the administration ofjustice by the courts, which proved decisive
for the recognition of the protection of written communications
to which they are parties [in AM&S], is now capable of being
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shared, to a certain degree, by certain categories of lawyers employed within undertakings on a permanent basis where they are
178
subject to strict rules of professional conduct."
In the AM&S case the Court had the benefit of a very comprehensive report on the state of the law on lawyer-client confidentiality in the - then nine 179 _ Member States (the "Edward
report"), and could rely on its own internal resources to complete its investigation. There is no such detailed report on the
present twenty-five Member States.180 The recent accession of
ten new Member States complicates a task that is out of the
reach of an individual -

if only for linguistic reasons

-

particu-

larly one who does not claim to be a comparatist. With all caution, though, it is possible to offer some fragmented illustration
of the way issues of legal privilege present themselves in Europe
twenty-three years after AM&S.
In the early 1980s, the Court found that the laws of the then
nine Member States diverged widely. Broadly speaking, the privilege was wider in common law jurisdictions, and extended without difficulty to communications passing between client and lawyer well before the initiation of any legal proceedings. Case law
in those jurisdictions rested comfortably on a utilitarian rationale. By contrast, in most civil lawjurisdictions, legal privilege as
such was unknown, altough the rights of the defense of the accused in criminal proceedings resulted in certain limitations for
the prosecution, or for an investigating authority. In practice,
this often meant a bar against lawyer testimony and the protection of documents in the possession of the lawyer. Documents in
178. Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd. and Akcros Chemicals Ltd. v. Commission, Joined
Cases T-125/03 R & T-253/03 R, [2004] E.C.R. _, [2004] 4 C.M.L.R. 15., 125. See id.
1 124, 126-130. As already stated, this order was annulled by the President of the
Court of Justice. See supra notes 155-156 and accompanying text. However, the President of the Court ofJustice only addressed the issue of urgency, and did not elaborate
on the substantive scope of legal privilege.
179. When the AM&S appeal was introduced, the European Economic Community counted nine Member States. Since then, sixteen additional countries have joined
the Community (now the European Union): Greece (1981), Spain and Portugal
(1986), Austria, Finland and Sweden (1995), and Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia. There
are four additional candidate countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, and Turkey), and
one application is pending (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia).
180. A report appears to have been produced in the Akzo cases pending before the
Court of First Instance (the "Fish report"). Information about comparative law in this
regard may be found in private or academic sources.
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the possession of the client were usually not privileged, and this
is still the case in many Member States (e.g., Austria, Italy, Lithuania, Spain, Sweden). Communications with and from in-house
counsel were usually not privileged, and in some jurisdictions
the timing of the communication was an essential consideration:
communications made before the initiation of legal proceedings
were generally not considered to be made within the framework
of the rights of defense of an accused. Thus, to the extent at
least that it shielded materials in the possession of the client, and
that it encompassed lawyer-client communications having passed
long before the initiation of an investigation, the legal privilege
rule of AM&S represented, from the point of view of many civil
law jurisdictions, an importation of a much broader concept inspired by the traditionally wider conception of the privilege in
common law countries.
As regards common law jurisdictions, the law has not
changed substantially. It is interesting to note, however, that academic commentary has either challenged the absolute nature
of the privilege and explored the desirability of introducing further exceptions,"' or perceived (while deploring it) a trend in
the courts towards restricting the scope of the privilege, a trend
including "anti-corporation bias" and "anti-in-house counsel
bias".'8 2 Some courts have partaken in this introspective exercise. Delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal on March
1, 2004, in Three Rivers, Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers stated:
We have found this area of law not merely difficult but unsat181. The driving notion of Auburn's book, for example, is that additional exceptions to the privilege would be feasible and are warranted. See generally AUBURN, supra
note 12. See Zacharias, supra note 30.
182. G. M. Giesel, The Legal Advice Requirement of the Attorney-Client Privilege: A Special Problemfor In-House Counsel and Outside Attorneys Representing Corporations,48 MERCER
L. REv. 1169 (1997) (criticizing strong "anti-corporation bias" and "anti-in-house counsel bias" in judicial application of the attorney-client privilege in the United States, and
collecting a large amount of cases where privilege has been denied or limited for corporate clients and in-house counsel). It has been argued that little benefit accrues from
applying the privilege to in-house counsel, yet much is lost, so the privilege should not
apply. SeeJames A. Gardner, A PersonalPrivilegefor Communications of CorporateClients Paradox or Public Policy?, 40 U. DET. L.J. 299, 354-62 (1963); see also United States of
America v. Philip Morris, (2003] E.W.H.C. 3028 (Comm.) (High Court), 1 38 ("in the
nature of things those who are employed ... are more likely than independent practitioners to become involved in aspects of the business that are essentially managerial or
administrative in nature. To that extent it is less easy to maintain that all communications passing between them and the company's management attract privilege").
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isfactory. The justification for litigation privilege is readily understood. Where, however, litigation is not anticipated it is
not easy to see why communications with a solicitor should be
privileged. Legal advice privilege attaches to matters such as
the conveyance of real property or the drawing up of a will. It
is not clear why it should. There would seem little reason to
fear that, if privilege were not available in such circumstances,
communications between solicitor and client would be inhibited. Nearly fifty years have passed since the Law Reform
Committee looked at this
area. It is perhaps time for it to
83
receive a further review.'

As to the material scope of the privilege in England and
Wales, in the recent judgment of the High Court in USP Strategies, Judge Mann helpfully distinguished the rules applying to
three categories of information in relation to the obtaining of
legal advice: "[r] eferences to the mere obtaining of legal advice
are not privileged;" "[r] eferences to the obtaining of legal advice
on a given subject matter are not privileged;" "references, which
evidence the content of that advice, are prima facie privileged."1'84 Arguably, if such an approach to the material scope of
the privilege were adopted by the Community courts, part of the
"proof dilemma" would be resolved during inspections: inspectors could, without breaching confidentiality, review the first
page of a document, and satisfy themselves as to the identity of
183. Three Rivers District Council v. The Governor & Company of the Bank of
England, [2004] E.W.C.A. Civ. 218 (Court of Appeal),
39. The Court also hinted that
the scope of privilege might be wider for individuals than for corporations. Id. 32.
Appeal against this judgment was allowed by the House of Lords after this Article was
completed. See Opinion of the Lords of Appeal of 11 November 2004, Three Rivers
District Council & Others v. The Governor & Company of the Bank of England, [2004]
U.KH.L. 48; see also Three Rivers District Council & Others v. Governor and Company
of the Bank of England (No. 5), 3 W.L.R. 667 (Court of Appeal, 2003) (holding that the
need for a client to make a "clean breast" of his case to his legal adviser is paramount
when litigation exists or is contemplated, but that it is not so clear that, in the absence
of contemplated litigation, there is any temptation for the client not to be candid; that
it is in the public interest that the courts should come to correctjudgments on the basis
of all relevant material, and that it is important that legal advice privilege be confined
to its proper limits). Commentary on the legal privilege aspects of the Three Rivers cases
were published by Clifford Chance LLP. See Clifford Chance Dispute Resolution News
in Brief, River Deep, Mountain High, Mar. 2004 (on file with author) (stating that "[t]he
trend of narrowing privilege .. .continues"); see also Clifford Chance Dispute Resolution News in Brief, Muddy Waters, May 2003 (on file with author); Clifford Chance Dispute Resolution News in Brief, Muddier Waters, Nov. 2003 (on file with author).
184. USP Strategies Plc v. London General Holdings Ltd., [2004] E.W.H.C. 373
(Ch) (High Court),
30.
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its author, as to the fact that legal advice is being sought or
given, and as to the subject matter of the legal advice. This
would enable them, in the vast majority of cases, to make a final
determination as to the Commission's position about the privileged status of the document or otherwise. The judgment in
USP Strategies further states the legal position regarding draft
agreements and business plans. Judge Mann said that a draft
agreement "created with a view to its being submitted to solicitors for advice does not, despite its purpose, attract privilege"
and that "[a]ny such copy ought therefore to be disclosed and
produced."1" 5 By contrast, "any version produced by the solicitor in draft for the purpose of carrying out his function of giving
legal advice to a client would . . .be privileged." Drafts passed
back to the clients, "on the assumption that they were part and
parcel of legal advice, are again privileged."'8 6 In Philip Morris,
Judge Moore-Bick stated that "it is necessary to approach a claim
critical manner than
of legal advice privilege in a rather more
187
has perhaps been the case in the past."
It would be necessary to go beyond a cursory look at some
recentjudgments in isolation in order to conclude that the common law is witnessing a trend towards limitation of the scope of
legal privilege. The least that can be said, however, is that the
privilege is not expanding.
In countries outside the common law tradition, the main
trend that can be identified is towards alignment with the requirements of AM&S in competition investigations. In Spain,
the competition authority (Tribunal de Defensa de la Competencia) has strictly followed AM&S in a recent case. 188 The
Netherlands and Sweden have introduced specific regulation of
privilege in competition proceedings, based on the Community
law standard in AM&S.' 9 Thus, in the Netherlands, the material scope of professional secrecy as generally defined for crimi185. The Court relies on Dubai Bank Ltd. v. Galadari, [1990] Ch. 1980, and
Sumitomo Corporationv. Credit Lyonnais Rouse Limited, 1 W.L.R. 479 (2002).
186. USP Strategies, [2004] E.W.H.C. 373, 48 (also stating that these answers "are
relatively straightforward").
187. Philip Morris, [2003] E.W.H.C. 3028, 38.
188. Resoluci6n de 22julio 22, (Expte. R 508/02 v, Pepsi-Cola/Coca-Cola) (Spain).
189. Both the Explanatory Memorandum to the Dutch Competition Act (1998)
and the Commentary to the Government Bill of the Swedish Competition Act (1993)
clearly state that LPP is introduced in national legislation in order to align it with the
EU model.
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nal and civil proceedings is now narrower than that available in
competition investigations, which has been broadened to cover
documents at the client's premises. In the Swedish Competition
Act, a provision has been introduced, according to which compulsory requests may not relate to written documents "the contents of which may be assumed to be such as to preclude the
possibility of examining a member of the Swedish Bar Association or any of his associates as a witness about it" and "which are
in his possession or in that of the person protected by his duty of
professional secrecy".19 0 Similarly in Germany, courts have struggled to incorporate the AM&S standard in a system where confidentiality of lawyer-client communications, generally speaking,
protects only documents at the lawyer's premises,' 9 and, even
then, only those communications with an "accused"
("Beschuldigten "), i.e., communications passed after charges have
been brought. AM&S's privilege for documents found at the client's premises well before the initiation of proceedings represents a higher degree of protection than generally available in
criminal investigations. In competition cases, some German
courts have converged towards the AM&S solution. 19 2 Paradoxically, this alignment on the Community standard for competition proceedings may result in some countries granting defendants in such proceedings a higher degree of protection than is
otherwise available under general domestic law in these countries, including in investigations under criminal law. Germany,
asjust seen, may be such an example. In Spain, there is at least a
judgment of the Constitutional Court holding that professional
secrecy claims cannot be used to oppose seizure of documents
during a search authorized by a court in the context of a criminal investigation.1 93 This is in sharp contrast with the broader
190. Konkurrenslag [Competition Act], (1993), as amended, art. 54,
(1)&(2)
(Swed.).
191. Strafprozessordnung [Code of Criminal Procedure], § 97, Abs. II, s. 1, (Germany). See id. § 53, Abs. I, s. 3 (listing Rechtsanwdlte [independent lawyers] among those
covered).
192. See, e.g., LG Bonn, Beschluss vom 27.3.2002 - 37 Qs 91/01, WuW/E DE-R,
917 judgment of the Landgericht Bonn of March 27, 2002] (Germany); Thomas Kapp
& Alexander Roth, Fdllt eine weitere Beschrdnkung des europarechtlichenLegal Privilege?, 49
RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTscHAFr 946 (2003) (providing commentary).

193. See STC 37/1989, Feb. 15, 1989, (Spanish Constitutional Court) (holding that
everything that is relevant to a criminal investigation may be seized if the search has
been duly authorized by ajudge, in conformity with Article 18(2) of the Spanish Constitution, and there is no argument about the legality or the conformity with the Constitu-
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privilege recognized in competition investigations.194
Those examples appear to indicate that AM&S exerts a
powerful "soft harmonization" appeal in several Member States.
It is appropriate to pause to consider what legal factors may be at
play in this process. There is no reason why Member State laws
should not converge towards EU law on procedural and evidentiary matters. But there is no general requirement to that effect
either. Indeed, the "procedural autonomy" of the Member
States has long been considered a basic principle of Community
law.1" 5 However, this principle is not without limits.
A first string of case law that is of interest here concerns the
obligations placed on Member States by the requirements of the
protection of fundamental rights in the Community. In defining
the scope of fundamental rights in the Community, the Court
draws inspiration from "the constitutional traditions common to
the Member States" and from international treaties for the protection of human rights on which the Member States have collaborated or to which they are signatories, "so that measures
which are incompatible with the fundamental rights recognized
by the constitutions of those States may not find acceptance in
the Community." This idea is now enshrined at the "constitutional" level in Article 6(2) of the Treaty on the European
Union, which provides that the Union "shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms . ..
and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to
the Member States, as general principles of Community law."
The Court has stated that the requirements of fundamental
rights "are also binding on the Member States when they impletion of the search itself; "secrecy" considerations (in that case, medical secrets) may not
be advanced to frustrate seizure of documents).
194. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
195. See Comet BV v. Produktschap voor Siergewassen, Case 45/76, [1976] E.C.R.
2043; Rewe-Zentralfinanz v. Landwirtschaftskammer ffir das Saarland, Case 33/76,
[1976] E.C.R. 1989. In specific connection with competition proceedings, see Otto v.
Postbank, Case C-60/92, [1993] E.C.R. 1-5683, 17 (holding that "the limitation on the
Commission' s power of investigation under Regulation No 17 with regard to an undertaking' s obligation to reply to questions, which the Court deduced from the principle
of respect for the rights of the defense (the right against self-incrimination recognized
in Orkem v. Commission, Case 374/87, [1989] E.C.R. 3283, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 502)
cannot be transposed to national civil proceedings involving the application of Articles
85 and 86 of the Treaty (now Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty) which exclusively
concern private relations between individuals").
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ment Community rules," and therefore "the Member States
must, as far as possible, apply those rules in accordance with
those requirements." ' 96 This strongly suggests that when national competition authorities apply Community competition
rules, they should adjust their procedures so that fundamental
rights are protected at the same level as they would be in proceedings before the Commission. This necessarily includes the
standard of protection of legal privilege, to the extent that it is
anchored in the rights-of-defense rationale and constitutes a "corollary" of a fundamental right.
It is thus very likely that the fact that the AM&S standard
derives from fundamental principles of Community law, elaborated in a manner consistent with the case law of the European
Court of Human Rights, explains the strong trend towards spontaneous harmonization. Because the legal privilege rule established in AM&S is grounded on the rights-of-defense rationale,
and because it mirrors closely the requirements established by
the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, national
courts read the judgments of the European Court of Justice in
this area as having a strong precedential value. This has led
some of them to extend the AM&S solution to competition proceedings conducted by national authorities, and perhaps this
movement may continue beyond that.
As just shown, AM&S represents a minimum standard
which must be respected by Member State competition authorities when they apply Community law. The next question, and
probably more interesting, is whether this process of convergence may also, eventually, affect national laws where the notion
of legal privilege is wider. In other terms: is the influence of
AM&S, as a matter of law, confined to the role of a minimum
standard? This is not altogether certain. Another string of case
law places obligations on the Member States to ensure that procedural rules applicable to the exercise of rights conferred by
Community law are not less favorable than those governing similar domestic actions (the principle of equivalence) and do not
render virtually impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of
rights conferred by Community law (the principle of effective196. Wachauf v. Bundesamt fur Erndhrung und Forstwir'tschaft, Case 5/88, [1989]
E.C.R. 2609,
17 & 19; Booker Aquacultur v. The Scottish Ministers, Joined Cases C20/00 and C-64/00, [2003] E.C.R. 1-7411,
88.
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ness). This case law, a direct offspring of the general principles
of direct effect and supremacy, has often required adjustment of
national procedural rules so as to ensure the existence of effective rights of action and remedies for the enforcement of rights
derived from Community law.197 It is important to note that this
case law does not necessarily stand for the general proposition
that "the application of Community law" by the Member States
must not encounter procedural obstacles.'
It is the "exercise
of rights derived from Community law" that must be protected.
But it is possible to envisage situations, at least in private litigation, where the application of overly protective legal privilege
rules in a Member States could, in specific circumstances, represent an insurmountable obstacle for the effective exercise, by
a plaintiff, of rights derived from Articles 81 and 82. On the
other hand, the Court has precisely stated in Otto v. Postbank that
its case law concerning the rights of the defense on administrative proceedings before the Commission for the enforcement of
Articles 81 and 82 "cannot be transposed to national civil proceedings involving the application of [Articles 81 and 82] which
exclusively concern private relations between individuals, since
such proceedings cannot lead, directly or indirectly, to the imposition of a penalty by a public authority". 19 9 In that case, the
Court of Justice held expressly that Community law did not require national law to recognize in civil proceedings a right
against self-incrimination based on its judgment in Orkem. This
is another area which requires clarification.
As to the existence of a privilege for in-house lawyers, the
197. See, e.g., Ansaldo Energia SpA v. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato,
Joined Cases C-279/96, C-280/96 & C-281/96, [1998] E.C.R. 1-5025; Upjohn, Case C120/97, [1999] E.C.R. 1-223,
32; Evans v. Secretary of State for the Environment,
Transport and the Regions, Case C-63/01, (ECJ, Dec. 4, 2003) (not yet reported),
69-70, 75-78.
198. There are, however, judgments supporting that broader proposition. See, e.g.,
Commission v. Greece, Case 68/88, [1989] E.C.R. 2965,
23-24 ("Article 5 of the
Treaty requires the Member States to take all measures necessary to guarantee the application and effectiveness of Community law ... they must ensure in particular that
infringements of Community law are penalized under conditions, both procedural and
substantive, which are analogous to those applicable to infringements of national law of
a similar nature and importance and which, in any event, make the penalty effective,
proportionate and dissuasive").
199. Otto v. Postbank, Case C-60/92, [1993] E.C.R. 1-5683,
17. A contrario, the
Court implied that administrative enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty
by national competition authorities would have to guarantee the same rights of defense
recognized in proceedings before the Commission.

1044

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 28:967

panorama in the Member States, and in particular in those having acceded to the Community after the AM&S judgment, does
not appear overwhelmingly oriented towards assimilation with
independent lawyers. The overall picture that emerges is as follows: (i) in certain Member States it is possible to be employed
and a member of the Bar (examples include notably the UK and
Spain); (ii) in certain Member States it is possible for employed
lawyers to be members of the Bar subject to specific limitations
(notably Germany and the Netherlands); (iii) in a considerable
number of Member States, membership of the Bar appears to be
incompatible with being in a relationship of employment (examples are Italy, France, Lithuania, Latvia, the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland, Sweden, Austria). To take just one of these, it
seems clear that there is no legal professional privilege for inhouse lawyers in Sweden, where rules on privilege are derived
from the rules on secrecy contained in the Code of Civil Procedure,2 0 0 which applies only to members of the Swedish Bar Association. No in-house lawyers are permitted to be members of the
Swedish Bar Association.
German law, while accepting that employed lawyers may remain members of the Bar, makes Bar membership dependent
on their ability to practice as independent lawyers for outside
clients, in addition to their duties for the employer.20 1 Only the
activity performed for clients other than the employer is considered as the activity of a Rechtsanwalt. Where the employed Rechtsanwalt acts for his employer, that activity is not regarded as the
activity of a Rechtsanwalt, on the ground that he/she is acting
inside an employment relationship governed by subordination.
It appears that while an employed lawyer may enjoy legal privilege inasmuch as he/she acts for outside clients, the communications between the in-house lawyer and the undertaking employing him or her are not privileged in German law.
In Belgium, the law establishing an "Institut des juristes
d'entreprise" (professional association providing the label of
"juristed'entreprise"or "company lawyer" on a purely voluntary basis) refers to a duty of confidentiality resting on these professionals. 20 2 In the initial draft, breaches of confidentiality were liable
200. Rattegtngsbalk [Code of Civil Procedure] (1942) (Swed.).
201. BVerfGE 87, 287(295) (Federal Constitutional Court of Germany).
202. Loi du ler mars 2000 creant un Institut des jurists d'entrepise [Act of March 1,
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to incur criminal sanctions referred to in Article 458 of the
Criminal Code. During the legislative debates, the reference was
dropped, clearly acknowledging that the confidentiality at stake
did not have the same scope as that of independent lawyers
("avocats") .23
In Spain, the situation of in-house lawyers is uncertain, although it is fair to say that no major developments have taken
place recently. The duty of professional secrecy is provided for
in article 542(2) (former article 437(2)204) of the Judicial Power
law (Ley Orgdinica del Poder Judicial) and (with identical wording) article 32(1) of the General Regulation of the Profession of
Lawyer (Estatuto General de la Abogacfa) .205 The duty of professional secrecy extends to facts and information known as a
result of "any of the types of professional practice." Article 27(4)
of the same statute provides for the possibility to offer professional services under an employment contract, but this clearly
concerns the lawyer working under contract in a law firm
("despacho individual o colectivo"). Although it appears that
lawyers may be able to retain Bar membership while employed as
in-house counsel, different local bar statutes clarify that the "abogado" referred to in the Judicial Power Law must be independent, not employed.2 °6
The Italian competition authority appears to draw inspiration from the AM&S judgment in its approach to legal privilege.
The "Consiglio di Stato" (Council of State) has recently confirmed this approach, as regards the exclusion of in-house coun20 7
sel.
In Poland, the legal profession is divided along functional
lines: advocacy and legal advice (the professional titles being
2000, concerning the creation of an Institute of company lawyers], art. 5, M.B. p. 23.252
(Belg.).
203. See generally Buyle and Durant, supra note 133.
204. See Ley Organica del PoderJudicial(Judicial Power Law] [hereinafter L.O.PJ.],
art. 542(3), amended by L.O.P.J. 2003, 19 (Spain).
205. See Estatuto General de la Abogacia [General regulation of the Profession of Lawyer] art. 32(1), (R.D. 2001, 658, B.O.E. 2001, 164) (Spain).
206. See, e.g., Boletin Oficial de Canarias [Statute of the Las Palmas Bar] arts.
8(1),(2)&(5), (2003, 223) (Spain). The Statute of the Las Palmas Bar makes clear that
in-house salaried lawyers are excluded from the scope of Article 436 (now 542) of the
L.O.P.J.
207. See AXA Assicurazioni v. Autorita Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato,
Cons. Stato, 26 Feb. 2002, no. 35491/2001 (Italy) (holding that documents not presenting a link with an external lawyer are not privileged).
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"adwokat" and "radca prawny" respectively). Both are subject to
similar confidentiality duties. Only the "adwokat" may plead in
court on behalf of a client in criminal cases. The status of "adwocat" is incompatible with a relationship of employment. Privilege seems to attach primarily to court testimony, and is regulated, for criminal matters, in Article 180 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Even the lawyer's privilege against compelled
testimony in court can be overridden by a court order "if required by the proper administration ofjustice and the facts cannot be established on the basis of other evidence".2 "° It seems
that in Poland, companies may be represented in court by any
employee (not necessarily a lawyer), but privilege applies only to
lawyers.
Once again, this review does not pretend to be exhaustive.
The task of presenting a complete - and possibly more accurate
picture is best left to specialists, and is in any event beyond
the scope of this article. However, a dispassionate review of a
number of jurisdictions, including the largest Member States
having joined the Community since the judgment in AM&S,
leaves the impression that the small minority of Member States
which had a broad conception of legal privilege in the early
1980s has become even smaller after successive enlargements.
The balance appears to have tilted further towards a restrictive
approach to evidentiary privileges for legal communications.
The evolution in recent years appears to have consisted, at most,
in "digesting" the AM&S standard of protection and adapting
similar solutions under national law. This process is still ongoing.
CONCLUSION
Legal privilege is obviously a sensitive subject for lawyers,
and one that often elicits emotional responses. Common law jurisdictions have witnessed extreme positions on the privilege,
from Jeremy Bentham's challenge to its very existence,2 °9 to advocates of radical expansion who recommend abolition of the
208. See Kodeks postpowania karnego [Polish Code of Criminal Procedure], art.
180(2), Dz.U 1969 nr 13 poz. 96, amended by Dz.U. 2003 nr 17 poz. 155. This provision
applies to lawyers, legal advisors, notaries, journalists, and doctors. Under article
180(1), other professionals subject to a duty of secrecy can be discharged from their
duty by either the court or the public prosecutor. Id. art. 180(1).
209. SeeJEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE (1827).
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requirements that communications be made in confidence 2 10 or
even that they relate to legal advice. 2 1 ' In stark contrast with
countries within the common law tradition, legal privilege in
most European jurisdictions remains relatively narrow.
The Court of Justice of the European Communities in
AM&S struck an intelligent balance that deserves respect for its
coherence with the most powerful rationale available for the
privilege. More than twenty years later, it is remarkable how
consistent the judgment appears to be with the case law of the
European Court of Human Rights, which sometimes appears
even to have been anticipated. There are many advantages to
the rights-of-defense rationale favored by the Court in AM&S,
and critics should pause to consider them. One of them is that
privileged legal communications do not necessarily lose their status whatever the degree of dissemination within the undertaking. The Court of Justice did not require that the communication be made strictly "in confidence." This is arguably sustainable in a construction of the privilege based on the rights of
defense, but would be much more problematic from a utilitarian
perspective, as the common law experience attests. The almost
impracticable distinction between "legal" and "business" advice 2 12 is also much less likely to arise under the AM&S standard
for two reasons. First, the privilege is confined to independent
lawyers (much less likely than in-house counsel to be involved in
non-legal communications with the client). Second, a rights-ofdefense rationale operates chiefly to protect legal communications about the compatibility of past behaviour, while business
advice is likely to concern decisions to be taken in the future.
The pragmatic, dispassionate approach to legal privilege of
the case law of the Court of Justice - and possibly, the restraint
of the Commission's inspectors - has contributed to a relatively
peaceful situation. Very few privilege claims have reached the
stage of litigation. Moreover, the rationale of the privilege as
construed by the Court ofJustice seems to facilitate adjudication
210. See Rice, supra note 47.
211. See Giesel, supra note 182.
212. See, e.g., The Attorney-Client Privilege, supra note 28, at 471 & n.30 (discussing
the "tenuousness of the business-legal distinction" and stating that "[w] hether a particular communication involves "legal" rather than merely "business" advice is ... a largely
discretionary judgment, one in all likelihood informed by a judge's ad hoc notion of
what is reasonable in a given case").
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of privilege claims. In particular, the rights-of-defense rationale
suggests that there may be room for the Commission to devise
an internal procedure whereby decisions to require production
of allegedly privileged documents would not have to be made in
the dark and litigated away. The Order of the President of the
Court of September 27, 2004, provides indirect support for such
an internal Commission procedure. This article suggests one
possible modus operandi, based on "in camera" review of allegedly privileged documents by the Hearing Officers. There may
be other possibilities.
It is also striking how AM&S, which introduced a concept of
legal privilege going well beyond what existed in many Member
States, has influenced developments in national law, and in particular in competition proceedings. The gravitational force of
AM&S and its influence on national laws may be explained to a
large extent by the rights-of-defense rationale and by the relative
consistency of the judgment with the case law of the European
Court of Human Rights. A paradox may, however, be emerging:
to the extent that protection of legal privilege at Community
level is perceived to exceed the requirements of fundamental
rights, in some countries corporations may now be able to successfully claim privilege in administrative competition proceedings, in situations where similar claims made by individual defendants in criminal cases would be rejected.
Many things have changed since the early 1980s. In particular, the Community has welcomed sixteen new Member States.
Scholars have taken a closer look, often through the lenses of
economic analysis, at issues surrounding the social desirability of
legal advice, lawyer confidentiality duties, and evidentiary privileges. Judges in traditional strongholds of the privilege, where
the rules had the maximum scope, have begun to question the
benefits of such wide protection. At Community level, the Akzo
cases have sparked lively discussion, and the Courts have not spoken their last word. Debate is taking place. In the meantime,
AM&S remains the cornerstone of the law of legal privilege in
competition proceedings conducted by the Commission. Critics
and admirers alike must recognize that the standards established
in AM&S have not given rise to serious difficulties in more than
twenty years. This is either a tribute to the wisdom of the Court
of Justice, or evidence that the legal community has learned to
live peacefully with it.

